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Abstract
Financial Markets with Delay
by
Seyyed Mostafa Mousavi
We propose two models to study different aspects of delay in financial markets. In
the first model, we discuss option pricing with delayed information. We study super
replication with delayed information in a discrete model and derive its continuous
limit. In the second model, we discuss systemic risk using a finite-player linear-
quadratic stochastic differential game with delay, where the evolution of log-monetary
reserves of banks is described by coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in
their drifts, and banks are minimizing their finite-horizon objective functions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In various areas of financial mathematics, a universal assumption is that there does
not exist any type of delay. This is mainly because delay adds memory to the system,
and in other words, it makes the corresponding stochastic processes non-Markov.
As [28] mentions, one of building blocks in the theory of stochastic processes is the
Markov property. Therefore, it is difficult to study Non-Markov processes as we no
longer have access to the well-developed machinery of Markov stochastic processes.
On the other hand, delay is a common element in many natural systems, and
as a result, it is more realistic to consider it in our models. In this endeavor, we
study delay in financial markets in this dissertation. Different types of delay can be
considered in financial markets. For example, we can have delay in the our flow of
information, or we can have control with delay in the state of our system.
We propose two models to study delay in financial markets. In the first model,
we attempt to model delay in the flow of information in option pricing. A common
assumption is that a trader makes his decisions with full access to the prices of the
assets, but there is always a lag between the times of order decision and execution. we
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start with the binomial model proposed by [10] and consider constant known periods
of delay in the information flow. Then, We take the worst case scenario approach
(i.e, super replication) to price and replicate contingent claims with convex payoff
functions. Also, we discuss the continuous time limit as the time-step and delay
length tend to zero. A very important consequence of our model is that it verifies the
intuition of traders that delayed information would exaggerate the volatility smile,
but it does not cause it.
In the second model, we propose a stochastic game model of inter-bank lending
and borrowing where banks can borrow from or lend to a central bank, but they need
to take responsibility for their past lending or borrowing. This model generalizes
the one in [6]. The evolution of the log-monetary reserves of N banks is described
by a system of coupled delayed stochastic differential equations. Each bank try to
minimize their finite time objective function by controlling the rate of borrowing or
lending. The banks are coupled through the average capitalization. We derive open-
loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria. Our results show that the delay reduces the
liquidity in the market. However, the central bank still acts as a clearing house.
The dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we discuss the first model,
that is option pricing with delayed information. In chapter 3, we present the model
of systemic risk and stochastic games with delay.
2
Chapter 2
Option Pricing with Delayed
Information
2.1 Abstract
We propose a model to study the effects of delayed information on option pricing.
We first talk about the absence of arbitrage in our model,and then discuss super repli-
cation with delayed information in a binomial model, notably, we present a closed
form formula for the price of convex contingent claims. Also, we address the conver-
gence problem as the time-step and delay length tend to zero and introduce analogous
results in the continuous time framework. Finally, we explore how delayed informa-
tion exaggerates the volatility smile. This chapter is a joint work with Tomoyuki
Ichiba.
3
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2.2 Introduction
All participants in financial markets have access only to delayed information.
Delay adds more uncertainty to the market, and it is of great importance to study it. A
universal assumption in options pricing literature is that a trader makes his decisions
with full access to the prices of the assets (i.e, no delayed information). However, in
practice, there is a lag between when the order is decided and its execution time. In
particular, there are two important types of delays in financial markets. First is the
delay in order execution, that is, the order would be executed with some delay after
the trader places it. For example, if the order is made in the morning, it would be
executed in the afternoon. Second is the delay in receiving information, that is, the
trader observes the prices and other important information with some delay, usually
because of the technological barriers, exacerbated by having long physical distance
from the exchange.
In the view of traders, these two types of delays act similarly. In both cases,
orders are executed with prices which are unknown at the time they are made. In
other words, the source of the delayed information does not change the decisions of
the trader. For example, let {0, 1, . . . } be a discrete trading horizon. If there exists
a delay with length of 1 period, then regardless of what the source of delay is, no
trade happens at time 0, and in later times trades happen based on the information
available up until the previous period. The reason is that if the delay is only in
receiving information, then, at time 0 the trader does not have any information, so
he waits till time 1 to get time-0 prices to make a trade and those trades would of
course be executed with time-1 prices. If the delay is only in order execution, then at
time-0 and based on time-0 prices, the trader makes an order, but that order would
be executed with time-1 prices.
4
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In this work, we start with the binomial model proposed by [10] and consider fixed
periods of delay in the flow of information. Therefore, agents have an information
stream smaller than the information flow of the traded asset. We show that the
market with delayed information is incomplete, and it is not possible to perfectly
replicate most contingent claims. Incomplete markets pose various challenges and for
a review of different approaches, we refer to [41]. We take the worst case scenario
approach, that is super replication, to price and replicate convex contingent claims.
This approach is first suggested by [12] in their seminal paper. We derive recursive
and closed-form formulas for pricing convex contingent claims in the discrete time
model. Later, we study the continuous time limit as the time-step and delay length
tend to zero. We show that the price process under our pricing measure converges to
the Black-Scholes price process, but with enlarged volatility.
A very interesting aspect of our model is the way it shows how delayed information
affects the volatility smile. Our model confirms the intuition of traders that delayed
information would exaggerate the volatility smile, but it does not cause it. We show
that in the continuous limit, volatility is constant and there is no smile, but in the
discrete model, we can observe volatility smile. In other words, it suggests the idea
that the smile observed in the market might not all be by the market itself, and it
could have been exaggerated because of the way we interact with delayed information.
Our model with delayed information has some similarities with the models with
transaction costs, notably in both models, we encounter similar limit theorems and
both risky asset price processes converge to the Black-Scholes price process with some
enlarged volatility. In other words, enlarging volatility can be considered as the way
to take into account both transaction costs and delayed information. [34] is first
to discuss transaction costs in option pricing models. [4] studies transaction costs
5
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in binomial models, and [31] provides rigorous limit theorems for such models. For
extensive literature on option pricing with transaction costs, we refer to [26].
[27] provides an absence of arbitrage condition in discrete time models with de-
layed information. [29] studies market viability in scenarios that the agent has de-
layed or limited information. In the literature, in markets with delayed information,
risk-minimizing hedging strategies, which is another hedging approach in incomplete
markets, have been studied. Using this approach, [11] models lack of information by
letting the assets to be observed only at discrete times, and [40] presents the general
case of restricted information. Some other works in this direction are [16], [35], [30]
and [7].
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2.3, we set up the discrete time
model with delayed information and define the super-replication price. We discuss
the super-replicating strategy in an N -period binomial model with H = N−1 periods
of delay in subsection 2.3.4, and we generalize the results to an N -period binomial
model with H periods of delay in subsection 2.3.5 using both dynamic programming
and direct approaches. A geometrical representation of the strategy is presented in
subsection 2.3.6. In section 2.4, we study the asymptotic behavior of the model as
the time step and delay length tend to zero. In particular, subsection 2.4.2 is devoted
to the discussion of how delayed information affects the volatility smile.
2.3 Discrete Time Model
Before introducing delays, let us recall the N -period binomial tree model of [10]
for a financial market with a single risky asset and a single risk-free asset (e.g., stock).
Given N ∈ N , let us denote by (Ω,F ,P) a probability space for the canonical space
6
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Ω := {0, 1}N of N -period binomial tree with the Borel σ-algebra F generated by
Ω . For every ω := (ω1, . . . , ωN) ∈ Ω we define a coordinate map by Zk(ω) = ωk for
each k = 1, . . . , N . Let P be the probability measure under which Zk , k = 1, . . . , N
are independent, Bernoulli random variables with P(Zk = 1) = P(Zk = 0) = 1 / 2 ,
k = 1, . . . , N . Define the filtration F := {Fk , k = 0, . . . , N} , where Fk is the
σ-field σ(Z1, . . . , Zk) generated by the first k variables for k = 1, . . . , N and F0 is
the trivial σ-field, i.e., F0 = {∅,Ω}.
In the N -period binomial tree model, the risky asset price Sk : Ω → R and its
discounted price S˜k : Ω→ R, discounted by instantaneous rate r > 0, at time k , are
defined by
Sk(ω) := S0 u
Ik(ω) dk−Ik(ω) , Ik(ω) :=
k∑
l=1
Zl(ω) , S˜k(ω) := e
−rk Sk(ω)
k = 1, . . . , N , (2.1)
where S0 is a given initial price of risky asset at time 0 , and u (or d ) is a fixed ratio
by which the price process goes up (or down) in one period with u > 1 + r > d > 0 .
The price processes are adapted to the filtration F .
2.3.1 Delayed Filtration
We shall introduce delays in the flow of information in the N -period binomial
model. For simplicity, let us consider the situation where an investor sends buy or
sell orders to the market at time t , but her orders are not executed until time t+H
with H ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} delay periods. The investor herself knows that she has
H delay periods when she is sending orders. Then we define the delayed filtration
7
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G := {Gk, k = 0, 1, . . . , N} , where Gk := F0 , for k = 0 , . . . , H − 1 , and
Gk := Fk−H , k = H , . . . , N , (2.2)
In other words, Gk is the information set of the price process until time min(k−H, 0) ,
rather than time k . In the following, we shall consider investments based on this
delayed information.
Let AG be the set of all G -adapted stochastic processes ∆ := {∆k , k =
0, . . . , N − 1} with ∆k ≡ 0 , k = 0, . . . , H − 1 . Here, each ∆ ∈ AG represents
a strategy for this investor based on the delayed information, that is, the positive
∆k > 0 (the negative ∆k < 0 , respectively) corresponds to the total number of
shares of the risky asset that the investor decides to own (to owe, respectively) at
time k , given information Gk . In other words, the order made at time k−H to buy
or sell (∆k −∆k−1) shares of the risky asset, gets executed at time k with price Sk
(not Sk−H ), because of H periods of delay. Thus the investor has to deal with the
risk of price changes between the time of order submission and execution.
For an initial investment of x0 in the risk free asset and a strategy ∆ ∈ AG , we
shall consider the portfolio value process Vk(x0,∆)(ω) , k = 0, . . . , N , ω ∈ Ω . The
first order ∆H submitted at time 0 is executed at time H , and the portfolio value
process is not observed until time H . Thus we define
VH(x0,∆)(ω) := x0 · erH + ∆H · SH(ω) ,
V0(x0,∆)(ω) := e
−rH · VH(x0,∆)(ω) = x0 + ∆H · S˜H(ω) , (2.3)
8
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and in general
Vk(x0,∆)(ω) :=

e−r(H−k) · VH(x0,∆) (ω) , k = 0, . . . , H − 1 ,
erkx0 +
k−1∑
l=H
Sl(ω) ·
(
∆(l−1)∨H −∆l
)
+ Sk(ω) ·∆(k−1)∨H ,
k = H, . . . , N .
(2.4)
For k = H, . . . , N , the first term in the portfolio value process (erkx0) in (2.4) corre-
sponds to the initial investment in the risk free asset. The second term (
∑k−1
l=H Sl(ω) ·
(∆(l−1)∨H −∆l)) is due to the cash flow in the risk free asset up until time k, and the
third term (Sk(ω)·∆(k−1)∨H) relates to the investment in the risky asset at time k. We
call Vk(x0,∆), k = 0, . . . , N the value process from the strategy (x0,∆) ∈ (R,AG).
By construction, the changes in the portfolio value process (Vk(x0,∆)) in (2.4)
starting from its first realization at time H, are only due to the variation in asset
prices. In other words, no money is added to or withdrawn from the portfolio.
Note that the initial portfolio value V0(x0,∆)(ω) in (2.3) is a random variable,
not a constant. This is because it is defined by discounting the time-H portfolio
value VH(x0,∆)(ω), which is the first time the portfolio value is observed due to the
existence of delay.
For k = H, . . . , N , ∆k is Gk -measurable, but Vk(x0,∆) is Fk-measurable.
Thus Vk(x0,∆) is Fk∨H-measurable for k = 0, . . . , N . In this sense, the portfolio is
constructed based on the delayed information.
9
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2.3.2 Absence of Arbitrage
We shall first introduce the notion of arbitrage in our model. In general, arbitrage
means that one cannot reap any benefit for free, that is without taking any risk. In
our model with delayed information, as it is shown in (2.3), the initial portfolio value
V0(x0,∆) is a random variable, because of the existence of delay. Therefore, we need
to adjust the classical notion of arbitrage in the domain of (R,AG) strategies, to take
this into account.
Definition 1 (Arbitrage). An arbitrage opportunity is the strategy (x0,∆) ∈ (R,AG)
such that
max
ω∈Ω
{V0(x0,∆) (ω)} = 0,
P(VN(x0,∆) ≥ 0) = 1, (2.5)
P(VN(x0,∆) > 0) > 0.
The primary difference with the classical definition of arbitrage is the condition
that the maximum of time-0 portfolio value needs to be zero (max
ω∈Ω
{V0(x0,∆) (ω)} =
0). It is obvious that in the case of complete information (i.e, H = 0), this definition
boils down to the classical definition of arbitrage opportunity.
We need to show that there is no arbitrage in our discrete time model with delayed
information. [27] proves that in a general discrete time model with restricted informa-
tion, there does not exist classical arbitrage, if and only if there exists a probability
measure P˜ equivalent to P such that the optional projection under P˜ of the discounted
stock price on the delayed filtration, is a P˜-martingale The setup of our model is a
bit different than that in [27], given that our first order to buy/ sell the risky asset
is executed at time H, rather than at time 0 (i.e. ∆k = 0, k = 0, . . . , H − 1). This
10
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makes the initial portfolio value (V0(x0,∆)) a random variable, rather than always a
constant. Theorem 1 shows that still in our model, there does not exists arbitrage,
in the sense of Definition 1.
Theorem 1. There does not exists any arbitrage opportunity in our discrete time
model, in the domain of (R,AG) strategies.
Proof. According to Definition 1, absence of arbitrage means that for any strategy
(x0,∆) ∈ (R,AG) such that max
ω∈Ω
{V0(x0,∆) (ω)} = 0, the condition P(VN(x0,∆) ≥
0) = 1 implies that P(VN(x0,∆) = 0) = 1.
In the domain of (R,AG), according to (2.3), the condition max
ω∈Ω
{V0(x0,∆) (ω)} =
0 is equivalent to
max
ω∈Ω
{VH(x0,∆) (ω)} = 0.
Which means that in all (N −H)-period binomial models starting from time H, the
initial values for the (x0,∆) strategy is non-positive.
If we consider all these (N − H)-period binomial models individually, they lie
in the general discrete time model framework in [27]. Therefore, in each of these
models, even if we consider the initial values of the strategy to be zero, the condition
P(VN(x0,∆) ≥ 0) = 1 implies P(VN(x0,∆) = 0) = 1, given that we show that
there exists a probability measure P˜ ∼ P such that the P˜-optional projection of the
discounted stock price on the delayed filtration, is a P˜-martingale That is
EP˜
(
S˜k+1|Gk
)
= EP˜
(
S˜k|Gk
)
, k = H, . . . , N − 1. (2.6)
Define the probability measure P˜ such that the coordinate maps Zk, k = 1, . . . , N are
11
Option Pricing with Delayed Information Chapter 2
still independent Bernoulli random variables, but with parameters
P˜(Zk = 1) =
uer − d
u− d = 1− P˜(Zk = 0), k ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
which are the risk-neutral probabilities in the usual binomial model without any delay.
Given that the discounted stock price (S˜k) is (Fk)-martingale under P˜, it follows
that condition (2.6) holds, which shows that there is not any arbitrage opportunity
from time H to N . Consequently, given (2.3), we conclude that there is not arbitrage
in the model in the domain of (R,AG) strategies.
Remark 1. The domain of (R,AG) strategies in Theorem (2.3.2) does not include
all F-adapted strategies, but only those which are G-adapted. In other words, we are
excluding the case that an agent with full information come and exploit the market
with delayed information. If we include all F-adapted strategies, it is likely to have
arbitrage opportunities.
2.3.3 Super-Replication Price
Given that there is no arbitrage in the market, it now makes sense to discuss
about pricing.
Definition 2 (Super-replication price and the value process of super-replicating port-
folio). For any contingent claim with payoff function ϕ : Ω→ R and expiration time
N , its super-replication price p¯i(ϕ) is defined as the minimal initial value of portfolio
which exceeds the value ϕ at time N , i.e.,
p¯i(ϕ) := inf
(x0,∆)∈Γ
max
ω∈Ω
{
V0(x0,∆)(ω) = x0 + ∆H S˜H(ω)
}
, (2.7)
12
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where
Γ := {(x0,∆) ∈ R×AG : VN(x0,∆) ≥ ϕ P− a.s.} . (2.8)
If there exists a pair (x∗0,∆
∗) that attains the infinitum in (2.7), i.e.,
p¯i(ϕ) = maxω∈Ω V0(x∗0,∆
∗)(ω) , then the time- k super replicating portfolio value
Vk(ω) is defined as
Vk(ω) := Vk(x∗0,∆∗)(ω) , k = 0, . . . , N , (2.9)
and consequently, p¯i(ϕ) = maxω∈Ω V0(ω) .
Remark 2. The super-replication price is the most conservative pricing approach for
the seller of the option, considering the worst-case scenario. In other words, it is
straightforward to show that any price greater than the super-replication price causes
arbitrage in the market.
Remark 3. It is remarkable to note that call-put parity does not hold anymore. The
reason is that the super-replication price p¯i is a coherent risk measure on the space
L∞(Ω,F,P) of payoff functions, and therefore it is sub additive
All of the results in this paper are for European-style contingent claims with
convex payoff functions. In section 2.3.4, we consider first the case H = N − 1 and
determine the super-replication price and the corresponding strategy. This would
make the building block for the general case discussed in section 2.3.5. The case for
non-convex payoff functions is computationally more demanding as we do not have
access to all the machinery developed for convex functions.
13
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S0
S0d
S0u
S0d
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S0ud
S0u
2
time 0 time 1 time 2
Figure 2.1: Asset price process Sk in a 2-period binomial model
2.3.4 An N-period binomial model with H = N − 1 periods
of delay
We determine the super-replication price and the corresponding strategy for the
European contingent claims when H = N − 1 . Having H = N − 1 periods of
delayed information means that at time 0 the risky asset price S0 is observed, but
the order ∆H , sent by the investor at time 0 , would be executed at time H . For
example, when N = 2 and H = 1 , the order ∆1 sent at time 0 is executed at
time 1 with two possible prices S1 = S0d or S1 = S0u (see Figure 2.1).
Let us observe that in the case of H = N − 1 , the terminal value VN(x0,∆) in
(2.4) is simplified to
VN(x0,∆)(ω) = e
rNx0 + SN(ω) ·∆N−1 . (2.10)
There are (N + 1) possible values of SN(ω) , ω ∈ Ω in (2.1) and there are only
two controls (x0,∆N−1) in the terminal value. Since there are (N + 1) constraints
and only two controls, the minimization problem in (2.7) has possibly infinitely many
solutions. In other words, in an economic sense, the market is not complete. To learn
more about pricing in incomplete markets, we refer to [41].
14
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Theorem 2. For a European-style contingent claim with payoff ϕ := Φ(SN) for
some convex function Φ(·) in the N-period binomial model with H = N −1 periods
of delay, the super-replication price is
p¯i(ϕ) = max
(
x∗0 + e
−rH ∆∗H · S0 uH , x∗0 + e−rH ∆∗H · S0 dH
)
, (2.11)
where the corresponding strategy (x∗0,∆
∗) is given by ∆∗j ≡ 0 , j = 0, 1, . . . , H − 1 ,
∆∗H = ∆
∗
N−1 =
Φ(S0u
N)− Φ(S0dN)
S0 · (uN − dN) and x
∗
0 = e
−rN · u
NΦ(S0d
N)− dNΦ(S0uN)
uN − dN .
(2.12)
Proof. First, we shall prove that for any ω ∈ Ω , (x∗0,∆∗) in (2.12) satisfies
inf
(x0,∆)∈Γ
{
V0(x0,∆)(ω) = x0 + ∆H S˜H(ω)
}
= V0(x
∗
0,∆
∗)(ω) = x∗0 + ∆
∗
H · S˜H(ω).
(2.13)
Here the infimum is taken over the set Γ in (2.8), that is, x0 ∈ R and ∆ ∈ AG
must satisfy VN(x0,∆) ≥ ϕ(SN) almost surely. Note that VN(x0,∆) = (erNx0 +
x · ∆N−1)|x=SN in (2.10) is realized as the value at x = SN of linear function
y = erN x0+x·∆N−1 with the slope ∆H and the y -intercept erNx0 in the (x, y) co-
ordinates. Moreover, since the payoff function Φ(·) is convex, by Jensen’s inequality,
one can verify
Γ = {(x0,∆) ∈ R×AG : erNx0 + S0uN ·∆N−1 ≥ Φ(S0uN),
erNx0 + S0d
N ·∆N−1 ≥ Φ(S0dN)} . (2.14)
That is, in order to check whether the inequality VN(x0,∆) ≥ Φ(SN) holds with
15
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probability one, it suffices to check it just at the extreme cases, in which the asset
price SN at time N is the minimum S0d
N or the maximum S0u
N in the binomial
tree model. Then it is easy to check that the choice (x∗0,∆
∗
H) in (2.12) belongs to the
set Γ as we have erNx∗0 + ∆
∗
HS0u
N = ϕ(S0u
N) , erNx∗0 + ∆
∗
HS0d
N = ϕ(S0d
N) . In
other words, the minimization problem is reduced to a linear programming problem
minimize
(x0,∆H)∈R2
x0 + ∆H · S˜H(ω)
subject to erNx0 + S0u
N ·∆H ≥ Φ(S0uN) ,
and erNx0 + S0d
N ·∆H ≥ Φ(S0dN) .
Define the Lagrangian as
L := x0 + ∆H S˜H(ω) + λ1[Φ(S0uN)−
(
erNx0 + S0u
N∆H
)
]
+λ2[Φ(S0d
N)− (erNx0 + S0dN∆H)] ,
where λ1 and λ2 are the Lagrangian multipliers. Then, it is easy to check that the
quantities
x∗0 = e
−rN · u
NΦ(S0d
N)− dNΦ(S0uN)
uN − dN , ∆
∗
H =
Φ(S0u
N)− Φ(S0dN)
S0uN − S0dN ,
λ∗1 =
S˜H(ω)− e−rNS0dN
S0 · (uN − dN) , λ
∗
2 =
e−rNS0uN − S˜H(ω)
S0uN − S0dN
satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the minimization. Hence, (2.13) fol-
lows, and it is the key to prove that
inf
(xo,∆)∈Γ
max
ω∈Ω
V0(x0,∆)(ω) = max
ω∈Ω
inf
(xo,∆)∈Γ
V0(x0,∆)(ω) . (2.15)
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Thus, we get
p¯i(ϕ) = max
ω∈Ω
inf
(xo,∆)∈Γ
V0(x0,∆)(ω) = max
ω∈Ω
V0(x
∗
0,∆
∗)(ω) . (2.16)
Then, the proof is completed by the following observation
max
ω∈Ω
{V0(x∗0,∆∗)(ω) = x∗0 + ∆∗H S˜H(ω)} =
max
(
x∗0 + e
−rH∆∗H · S0uH , x∗0 + e−rH∆∗H · S0dH
)
. (2.17)
By using Theorem 2, the portfolio value VH ∈ FH in (2.9) at time H of the
super-replicating strategy can be calculated as
VH = erHx∗0 + ∆∗H · SH =
H∑
j=0
e−r(N−H) EQj [Φ(SN)] · 1{SH =S0 uj dH−j}
=
H∑
j=0
e−r(N−H)
[
pj Φ(S0u
N) + qj Φ(S0d
N)
] · 1{SH =S0 uj dH−j}.
(2.18)
Here {Qj}Hj=0 are probability measures on (Ω,F) defined by
Qj(IN = N) := pj = 1−Qj(IN = 0) = 1− qj ,
pj :=
ujdH−jer(N−H) − dH+1
uH+1 − dH+1 , j = 0, . . . , H . (2.19)
Remark 4. We can conclude from the form in (2.18) that VH , the value of the
17
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super-replicating portfolio at time H, is a function of S0 and SH . In other words
VH ≡ VH(S0, SH),
Therefore, the value process for the super-replicating portfolio is path dependent,
due to the existence of H periods of lag between the times of order submission and
execution.
Thus, the super-replication price p¯i(ϕ) can be calculated as
p¯i(ϕ) = max
ω∈Ω
V0 (ω) = max
j∈{0,...,H}
e−rN EQj [Φ(SN)] = max
j∈{0,H}
e−rN EQj [Φ(SN)]
= max
j∈{0,H}
e−rN
[
pjΦ(S0u
N) + qjΦ(S0d
N)
]
= e−rN max
(
puΦ(S0u
N) + quΦ(S0d
N) , pdΦ(S0u
N) + qdΦ(S0d
N)
)
. (2.20)
where the third equality follows similarly as in (2.17).
Notation: From now on, we use (pu, qu) as (pH , qH) and (pd, qd) as (p0, q0) , since
(pH , qH) and (p0, q0) correspond to the measures at the extreme points SH = S0u
H
and SH = S0d
H respectively.
2.3.5 An N-Period binomial Model with H Periods of Delay
We extend our considerations from section 2.3.4 and generalize the model to the
N -period binomial model with H(≤ N − 1) periods of delay. We determine the
super-replication price and the corresponding strategy for European style contingent
claims with convex payoff functions. Here we shall solve the problem from both a
dynamic programming (or backward induction) approach and a direct approach.
18
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Dynamic Programming Approach
First, let us define the tree TN(0, 0) of length N as the set of nodes (i, j) , such
that there are i ups and j downs from the node (0, 0) with 0 ≤ i+ j ≤ N , i.e.,
TN(0, 0) := {(i, j) ∈ N20 : 0 ≤ i+ j ≤ N}
Then define its (H + 1)-period subtree TH+1(a, b) starting from the node (a, b) at
time a+ b by
TH+1(a, b) := {(i, j) ∈ N20 : a+ b ≤ i+ j ≤ a+ b+H + 1 , i ≥ a , j ≥ b}
for every (a, b) ∈ TN(0, 0) such that a+ l ≤ N − (H + 1).
We shall identify all N −H subtrees TH+1(a, b) starting from the nodes (a, b) at
time N − (H + 1) (i.e, a + b = N − (H + 1) ). We use the results in section 2.3.4
and consider the value process of the super-replicating portfolio at time N − 1 as the
new payoffs for the next round of (H + 1)-period subtrees starting from the nodes at
time N − (H + 2) . Then, we keep super-replicating backwards in the same manner.
Remark 5. Given that in the dynamic programming approach, we are using the
results in section (2.3.4) in each step, and Remark (4), we can conclude that the
value process at level k ∈ {H, . . . , N} for the super-replicating strategy in the general
model is also path dependent, that is
Vk ≡ Vk(Sk−H , Sk), k = H, . . . , N . (2.21)
Therefore, let us define the payoff for the subtree TH+1(a, b) starting from the
19
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node (a, b) at time a+ b at its leaf node (p, q) (i.e, p+ q = a+ b+H + 1 ) by
ΦTH+1(a,b) (p, q) :=

Vp+q
(
Sa+bd , Sa+bd
H+1
)
if p = a ;
max
{
Vp+q
(
Sa+bd , Sa+bu
idH+1−i
)
,
Vp+q
(
Sa+bu , Sa+bu
idH+1−i
)}
if p = a+ i , i = 1, . . . , H ;
Vp+q
(
Sa+bu , Sa+bu
H+1
)
if p = a+H + 1 ;
(2.22)
for p+ q ≤ N − 1, and ΦTH+1(a,b) (p, q) := Φ(SN) , p+ q = N where SN = S0updq.
Intuitively, for the subtree TH+1 (a, b) starting at time a + b , there are only two
(H+1) -period subtrees, TH+1 (a+ 1, b) and TH+1 (a, b+ 1), starting at time a+b+1
that can induce payoff at time p + q . So, we need to take the maximum of the
two possible value process as the new payoff because we always consider worst case
scenario in super replication. Note that at the edge points, there exists only one value
process.
Example 1. In the 4 -period binomial tree model (as in Figure 2.2) with H = 1 , what
new payoff we need to consider on the node S3 = S0u
2d depends on whether we are
considering this node as part of the subtree T2 (1, 0) or T2 (0, 1). As part of the subtree
T2 (1, 0), the payoff
(
ΦT2(1,0) (2, 1)
)
would be the maximum of the corresponding value
processes of the subtrees T2 (1, 1) and T2 (2, 0), while as part of the subtree T2 (0, 1),
the payoff
(
ΦT2(0,1) (2, 1)
)
would be the corresponding value processes of the subtrees
T2 (1, 1).
One important ingredient in the dynamic programming approach is that when
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we start from a convex payoff function, the payoff in (2.22) for all the intermediary
(H + 1) -period subtrees needs to be convex with respect to the corresponding risky
asset prices, in order to be able to use Theorem (2) in each step and keep super-
replicating backwards. Theorem (3) formalizes this relation.
Theorem 3. For a European-style contingent claim with payoff ϕ := Φ(SN) for
some convex function Φ(·) in the N-period binomial model with H ≤ N−1 periods
of delay, the payoff function ΦTH+1(a,b) (., .), a+b = 0, . . . , N−(H+1) in (2.22) for all
the intermediary (H + 1)-period subtrees are convex with respect to the corresponding
risky asset prices.
Proof. Note that for a + b = N − (H + 1), the payoff functions ΦTH+1(a,b) (., .) for
all (N − H) intermediary (H + 1)-period subtrees are convex, since the final payoff
function Φ(SN) is convex.
Now we show that all the payoff functions ΦTH+1(a′,b′) (., .), a
′+ b′ = a+ b− 1 will
be convex, if all the payoff functions ΦTH+1(a,b) (., .), a+ b ∈ {0, . . . , N − (H + 1)} are
convex. By induction this completes the proof.
Given that the payoff function ΦTH+1(a,b) (., .) is convex, by Theorem (2), there
exists x∗1 and ∆
∗
1 such that we define
h1(t) :=

Va+b+H(Sa′+b′u , Sa+b+H ) = erHx∗1 + ∆∗1t,
t ∈ {Sa′+b′udH , . . . , Sa′+b′uH+1};
erHx∗1 + ∆
∗
1t, t = Sa′+b′d
H+1,
21
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Similarly, there exists x∗2 and ∆
∗
2 such that we define
h2(t) :=

Va+b+H(Sa′+b′d , Sa+b+H ) = erHx∗2 + ∆∗2t,
t ∈ {Sa′+b′dH+1, . . . , Sa′+b′uHd};
erHx∗2 + ∆
∗
2t, t = Sa′+b′u
H+1,
we can define
h(t) := max (h1(t), h2(t)) , t ∈ {Sa′+b′dH+1, . . . , Sa′+b′uH+1}; (2.23)
Note that h(t) = ΦTH+1(a′,b′) (p, q) where t := S0u
pdq, given that ΦTH+1(a,b) (., .) is
convex, and (2.22).
The discrete function h(.) is convex if for any v and w such that S0u
vdw ∈
{Sa′+b′udH , Sa′+b′uHd}, we have
h (tp) + h (tn) ≥ 2h (tm) . (2.24)
where tp : = S0u
v−1dw+1, tn : = S0uv+1dw−1 and tm : = S0uvdw.
Depending on the choice of v and w, there are 4 cases:
Case 1: h(tp) = h1(tp) and h(tn) = h1(tn). Then, given the form in (2.23), we have
h(tm) = h1(tm). Then, it is straightforward to show that (2.24) follows by linearity
of the function h1(tm).
Case 2: h(tp) = h2(tp) and h(tn) = h2(tn). This case follows similar to that of case 1.
Case 3: h(tp) = h1(tp) and h(tn) = h2(tn). Then, h(tm) would equal to either h1(tm)
or h2(tm). Without loss of generality assume that h(tm) = h1(tm). Then given that
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h(tn) = h2(tn), we conclude by the form in (2.23) that h2(tn) ≥ h1(tn). So, we derive
h (tp) + h (tn) = h1 (tp) + h2 (tn) ≥ h1 (tp) + h1 (tn) ≥ 2h1 (tm) = 2h (tm) .
Where the last inequality follows by the linearity of the h1(.) function.
Case 4: h(tp) = h2(tp) and h(tn) = h1(tn). This case follows similar to that of case
3.
Therefore, given Theorem (3), we can apply the dynamic programming approach,
and derive the portfolio value Vk(Sk−H , Sk) in (2.21) at level k = a + b + H, k ∈
{H, . . . , N − 1} of the super-replicating strategy, using representation (2.18), as
Vk(S0uadb, Sk) =
H∑
j=0
e−r
[
pjΦTH+1(a,b) (a+H + 1, b)
+qjΦTH+1(a,b) (a, b+H + 1)
]
1{Sk=Sk−HujdH−j}, k = H, . . . , N − 1.
(2.25)
where pj and qj, j = 0, . . . , H are defined as in (2.19).
Plugging in (2.22) for k = H, . . . , N − 2, we obtain the key recursive formula
Vk(Sk−H , Sk) =
H∑
j=0
e−r
[
pjVk+1(Sk−Hu , Sk−HuH+1)
+qjVk+1(Sk−Hd , Sk−HdH+1 )
]
1{Sk=Sk−HujdH−j}, k = H, . . . , N − 2.
(2.26)
Remark 6. We can conclude that, when we are super-replicating backwards, the value
process Vk(Sk−H , Sk) in (2.21) is only required at the two extreme points Sk = Sk−HuH
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Figure 2.2: Asset price process Sk in a 4-period binomial model
and Sk = Sk−HdH , because of the form on the right hand side of the recursive formula
(2.26). In other words, we just use (pu, qu) = (pH , qH) and (pd, qd) = (p0, q0).
Therefore, similar to (2.20), the super-replication price p¯i(ϕ) can be finally calcu-
lated as
p¯i(ϕ) = e−rH max
(VH(S0, S0uH),VH(S0, S0dH)) . (2.27)
Direct Approach
In this section, we solve the recursive equation (2.26) and obtain the value process
Vk(Sk−H , Sk) for the super-replicating strategy explicitly. As Remark (6) suggests,
when we super-replicate backwards, we just need the value process at the extreme
points, that is Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HuH) and Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HdH), k = H, . . . , N − 1.
Define probability spaces (Ωk,Fk,Qk) for k = H, . . . , N − 1 with Ωk = {0, 1}N˜+H ,
the Borel σ-algebra Fk on Ωk, and N˜ = N − k. For every ωk = (ωk,1, . . . , ωk,N˜+H) ∈
Ωk, we define a coordinate map by Zk,m(ωk) = ωk,m for each m ∈ {1, . . . , N˜ +H}.
Let Qk be the probability measure under which Zk,m,m = 1, . . . , N˜ + H with
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initial position Zk,0 is a Markov chain, and for l = 1, . . . , N˜ − 1, it has transition
matrix
Q =
 qd pd
qu pu
 on {0, 1}, (2.28)
Besides, for l = N˜ , . . . , N˜ +H,
Qk
(
Zk,N˜+H = · · · = Zk,N˜ = 1|Zk,N˜−1 = 1
)
= pu,
Qk
(
Zk,N˜+H = · · · = Zk,N˜ = −1|Zk,N˜−1 = 1
)
= qu,
Qk
(
Zk,N˜+H = · · · = Zk,N˜ = 1|Zk,N˜−1 = 0
)
= pd,
Qk
(
Zk,N˜+H = · · · = Zk,N˜ = −1|Zk,N˜−1 = 0
)
= qd. (2.29)
The risky asset price Sk−H+m satisfies
Sk−H+m := Sk−HuIk,mdm−Ik,m , Ik,m =
m∑
l=1
Zk,l, m = 1, . . . , N˜ +H , (2.30)
Remark 7. Under measures Qk, k = H, . . . , N−1, pu is the probability of an upward
move preceded with an upward move, qu is the probability of a downward move pre-
ceded with an upward move, pd is the probability of an upward move preceded with a
downward move, and qd is the probability of a downward move preceded with a down-
ward move. Besides, equations (2.29) are to ensure that the last H + 1 moves are all
either upward or downward.
Remark 8. Under measures Qk, k = H, . . . , N − 1, probability of a downward move
preceded by a downward move (qd) is higher than the probability of a downward move
preceded by an upward move (qd). Similar is also true for upward moves. So, the vari-
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ance of the risky asset price is higher under these measures than the initial measure
P.
Remark 9. If we put H = 0, the transition matrix (2.28) would have duplicate
rows (i.e. pu = pd and qu = qd). Therefore, in this case, the model boils down
to the binomial tree model of [10], and all the equations get significantly simplified
accordingly.
Theorem (4) expresses Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HuH) and Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HdH), k = H, . . . , N−
1 as expectations under the measure Qk.
Theorem 4. For a European-style contingent claim with payoff ϕ := Φ(SN) for
some convex function Φ(SN) ∈ L∞(Ωk,Fk,Qk), k = H, . . . , N − 1, the value process
Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HuH) and Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HdH), k = H, . . . , N−1 for the super-replicating
strategy, in an N-period binomial model with H periods of delay, can be calculated as
Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HuH) = e−rN˜EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1) , (2.31)
Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HdH) = e−rN˜EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 0) . (2.32)
Proof. We need to show that (2.31) and (2.32) satisfy the recursive equation (2.26)
for k = H, . . . , N − 2, and equation (2.25) for k = N − 1. For k = N − 1, it is already
shown in (2.18), and for k = H, . . . , N − 2, by conditioning on Zk,1, (2.31) satisfies
Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HuH) = e−rN˜EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1) ,
= e−rN˜
[
EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1, Zk,1 = 0)Qk(Zk,1 = 0|Zk,0 = 1)
+EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1, Zk,1 = 1)Qk(Zk,1 = 1|Zk,0 = 1)
]
.
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Note that by the way the spaces (Ωk,Fk,Qk) and (Ωk+1,Fk+1,Qk+1) are con-
structed,
EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1, Zk,1 = 0) = e−rEQk+1 (Φ (SN) |Zk+1,0 = 0) ,
EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1, Zk,1 = 1) = e−rEQk+1 (Φ (SN) |Zk+1,0 = 1) .
Also, Qk(Zk,1 = 0|Zk,0 = 1) = qu and Qk(Zk,1 = 1|Zk,0 = 1) = pu. Therefore,
Vk(Sk−H , Sk−HuH) = e−rN˜
[
puEQk+1 (ϕ (SN) |Zk+1,0 = 1)
+quEQk+1 (ϕ (SN) |Zk+1,0 = 0)
]
,
= e−r
[
puVk+1(Sk−H+1 = Sk−Hu, Sk+1 = Sk−HuH+1)
+quVk+1(Sk−H+1 = Sk−Hd, Sk+1 = Sk−HdH+1)
]
.
which completes the proof. Similarly, it can also be shown for (2.32).
Remark 10. If we are interested just to find out the time-0 super-replication price
p¯i(ϕ), we only need the probability space (ΩH ,FH ,QH) where ΩH = {0, 1}N . Then,
we would have
p¯i(ϕ) = e−rN max
{
EQH (Φ (SN) |ZH,0 = 1) ,EQH (Φ (SN) |ZH,0 = 0)
}
. (2.33)
Lemma 1 calculates EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1), k = H, . . . , N − 1.
For H + 1 ≤ i ≤ N˜ +H − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ min(i−H, N˜ +H − i). Define
f(i, j) :=
(
N˜ +H − i− 1
j − 1
)(
i−H
j
)
q(j)u q
(N˜+H−i−j)
d p
(i−j−H)
u p
(j)
d . (2.34)
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Also for 0 ≤ i ≤ N˜ − 2, 1 ≤ j ≤ min(i+ 1, N˜ − i− 1), define
h(i, j) :=
(
N˜ − i− 2
j − 1
)(
i
j − 1
)
q(j)u q
(N˜−i−j)
d p
(i−j+1)
u p
(j−1)
d
+
(
N˜ − i− 2
j − 1
)[(
i+ 1
j
)
−
(
i
j − 1
)]
q(j+1)u q
(N˜−i−j−1)
d p
(i−j)
u p
(j)
d .
(2.35)
Lemma 1. For a function Φ(SN) ∈ L∞(Ωk,Fk,Qk), k = H, . . . , N−1, the conditional
expectation EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1) can be explicitly calculated as
EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1) =
N˜+H∑
i=0
Qk
(
SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i|Zk,0 = 1
)
Φ(Sk−HuidN˜+H−i),
(2.36)
where Qk
(
SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i |Zk,0 = 1
)
is given by

min(i+1,N˜−i−1)∑
j=1
h(i, j) 0 ≤ i ≤ H;
min(i+1,N˜−i−1)∑
j=1
h(i, j) +
min(i−H,N˜+H−i)∑
j=1
f(i, j) H + 1 ≤ i ≤ N˜ − 2;
p
(N˜−1)
u qu +
min(N˜−H−1,H+1)∑
j=1
f(i, j) i = N˜ − 1;
min(i−H,N˜+H−i)∑
j=1
f(i, j) N˜ ≤ i ≤ N˜ +H − 1;
p
(N˜)
u i = N˜ +H,
(2.37)
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Proof. Note that Qk
(
SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i|Zk,0 = 1
)
, i = 0, . . . , N˜ +H is the sum of
several products of N˜ elements chosen out of {pu, pd, qu, qd}, and each product term
corresponds to a path in the tree starting from the node Sk−H , and ending in the
node SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i.
Given equations (2.29), the last H + 1 moves need to be either upward or down-
ward, and they contribute to as just one single move. Since it is conditioned on
Zk,0 = 1, according to Remark (7), the first element in all of the product terms is either
qu or pu. For H+1 ≤ i ≤ N˜−2, the last (H+1)-period move to SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i
can be both downward and upward.
In the case that it is upward, we need to consider all the paths starting from
Sk−H to SN−2 = Sk−Hui−2dN˜+H−i which consist of i − 2 upward moves and N˜ +
H − i downward ones. There are (N˜+H−2
ı−2
)
of such paths, but these paths are not
all equivalent and result in different product terms of N˜ elements chosen out of
{pu, pd, qu, qd}, based on the location of the N˜ +H − i downward moves in the path.
Note that all paths which have the same number of downward groups result in the
same product terms, where a downward group is any number of consecutive downward
moves preceded (if any) by an upward move and also succeeded (if any) by an upward
move. For example, both of the sequences↗↘↘↘↗↘ and↘↘↗↗↘↘ have two
groups of ↘ moves. The reason for studying downward groups is that the starting
element in all of them is qu.
In this notation, j corresponds to the number of groups which starts from 1
(assuming that there exists at least one downward move) and can reach to min(i −
H, N˜ + H − i). Notice that there are (N˜+H−i−1
j−1
)(
i−H
j
)
paths which have exactly j
groups. Therefore, along those path the power of both qu and pd is j and consequently,
the powers of qd and pu are respectively N˜ +H − i− j and i− j −H. Here f(i, j) in
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equation (2.34) corresponds to these paths.
The second case is that the last (H+1)-period move is downward. Then, we need
to consider all the paths starting from the node Sk−H to SN−2 = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i−2
which consist of i upward moves and N˜ + H − i − 2 downward ones. Here not
only the number of downward moves is important, but also the direction (upward or
downward) of the move from time N − 3 to N − 2 is also relevant.
Note that there are
(
N˜−i−2
j−1
)(
i
j−1
)
paths which have exactly j groups such that the
last 1-period move from N − 3 to N − 2 is downward, so the corresponding product
term is q
(j)
u q
(N˜−i−j)
d p
(i−j+1)
u p
(j−1)
d , and there are
(
N˜−i−2
j−1
)
[
(
i+1
j
)−( i
j−1
)
] paths which have
exactly j groups such that the last 1-period move from N − 3 to N − 2 is upward.
The function h(i, j) in equation (2.35) takes all these paths into account.
For H + 1 ≤ i ≤ N˜ − 2, it is necessary to use both f(i, j) and h(i, j) to take
into account that the last (H + 1)-period move can be both upward and downward.
The same reasoning works for 0 ≤ i ≤ H and N˜ ≤ i ≤ N˜ + H − 1, but here the
last (H + 1)-period move can only be downward for 0 ≤ i ≤ H and upward for
N˜ ≤ i ≤ N˜ +H − 1. For i = N˜ − 1 when the last (H + 1)-period move is downward
and i = N˜ + H, the fuctions f(i, j) and h(i, j) cannot be used because in all of the
paths from Sk−H to SN−2 = Sk−HuN˜+H−2, there is not any downward move at all to
make a downward group (i.e, j = 0).
Similarly, Lemma 2 calculates EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 0), k = H, . . . , N − 1. Also for
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H + 2 ≤ i ≤ N˜ +H, 1 ≤ j ≤ min(i−H − 1, N˜ +H − i+ 1), define
f˜(i, j) :=
(
i−H − 2
j − 1
)(
N˜ +H − i
j − 1
)
q(j−1)u q
(N˜+H−i−j+1)
d p
(i−j−H)
u p
(j)
d
+
(
i−H − 2
j − 1
)[(
N˜ +H − i+ 1
j
)
−
(
N˜ +H − i
j − 1
)]
q(j)u q
(N˜+H−i−j)
d p
(i−j−H−1)
u p
(j+1)
d .
(2.38)
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N˜ − 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ min(i, N˜ − i), define
h˜(i, j) :=
(
i− 1
j − 1
)(
N˜ − i
j
)
q(j)u q
(N˜−i−j)
d p
(i−j)
u p
(j)
d . (2.39)
Lemma 2. For a function Φ(SN) ∈ L∞(Ωk,Fk,Qk), k = H, . . . , N−1, the conditional
expectation EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1) can be explicitly calculated as
EQk (Φ (SN) |Zk,0 = 1) =
N˜+H∑
i=0
Qk
(
SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i|Zk,0 = 1
)
Φ(Sk−HuidN˜+H−i),
(2.40)
where Qk
(
SN = Sk−HuidN˜+H−i |Zk,0 = 1
)
is given by
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
q
(N˜)
d i = 0
min(i,N˜−i)∑
j=1
h˜(i, j) 1 ≤ i ≤ H;
q
(N˜−1)
d pd +
min(H+1,N˜−H−1)∑
j=1
h˜(i, j) i = H + 1;
min(i,N˜−i)∑
j=1
h˜(i, j) +
min(i−H−1,N˜+H−i+1)∑
j=1
f˜(i, j) H + 2 ≤ i ≤ N˜ − 1;
min(i−H−1,N˜+H−i+1)∑
j=1
f˜(i, j) N˜ ≤ i ≤ N˜ +H.
(2.41)
Proof. The proof follows very similarly as that of Lemma 1 with only this difference
that since Zk,0 = 0, we look for upward groups instead of downward groups.
2.3.6 Geometrical Representation
In this subsection, we first discuss Theorem 2 from a geometrical perspective Then,
we represent the dynamic programming approach in subsection 2.3.5 geometrically
For convenience, assume that interest rate r = 0, and H = 1 in this subsection.
In Theorem 2, we discussed that in an N -period binomial model with H = N − 1
periods of delay, for a European-style convex contingent claim with payoff function
ϕ := Φ(SN) ∈ L∞(Ω,F,P), there exist ∆∗H and x∗0 such that
VH(S0, SH) = x∗0 + ∆∗HSH . (2.42)
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S2
Φ(S2)
S0d2 S0d S0S0ud S0u S0u2
x∗0
Φ
Optimal Line
V1(S0, S1 = S0u)
V1(S0, S1 = S0d)
Figure 2.3: Super-replicating Strategy in a 2-period binomial Model with a
1-period Delay. The optimal line characterizes the super-replicating strategy.
The slope of it is ∆∗1 and its intercept is x∗0. The super-replication price is
p¯i(ϕ) = max {V1(S0, S1 = S0d),V1(S0, S1 = S0u)}.
This suggests that there exists a line with slope ∆∗H and intercept x
∗
0 such that the
super-replicating value function VH(S0, SH) lie on that line. Figure 2.3 shows this
optimal line, the super-replication price, and the super-replicating value functions in
a 2-period binomial model with 1 period of delay.
It is more intuitive to demonstrate the dynamic programming approach in sub-
section 2.3.5 geometrically Figure 2.2 shows a 4-period binomial model with 1-period
delay. Figure 2.4 shows how to geometrically find the super-replication price for a
contingent claim with convex payoff function (Φ(.)). For convenience and to avoid a
clutter of points on the x-axis, suppose ud = 1, so some of the points in the model
lie on each other.
Now in order to find the super-replication prices at time 3, it is necessary to
consider the three 2-period binomial models with 1-period delay T2(2, 0), T2(1, 1)
and T2(0, 2). In Figure 2.4, the lines (om), (nl) and (mk) show the optimal super-
replication lines for each of these models respectively. As it can be seen, there are two
payoffs at either of the nodes S3 = S0u
2d and S3 = S0ud
2 depending on which subtree
is used for pricing (i.e. depending on what S1 is). Now, we go one period further back
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S4
Φ(S4)
S0d
4 S0d
3 S0ud
3 S0ud
2S0u
2d2S0u
2d S0u
3d S0u
3 S0u
4
S0d
2 S0d S0ud S0u S0u
2
S0
Φ
mk nl
omjh
ig
fd
V1(S0, S1 = S0u)
V1(S0, S1 = S0d)
Figure 2.4: Geometrical Representation of the Super replicating Strategy in a
4-period binomial Model with 1-period Delay using a Dynamic Programming Ap-
proach
to find out the payoffs at time 2. We need to consider two 2-period models T2(1, 0)
and T2(0, 1). Note that in each of these two models, the corresponding payoff at nodes
S2 = S0u
2d (out of two payoffs ΦT2(1,0) (2, 1) and ΦT2(0,1) (2, 1) ) and S2 = S0ud
2 (out
of two payoffs ΦT2(1,0) (1, 2) and ΦT2(1,0) (1, 2) ) needs to be chosen. As Theorem (3)
suggests, the payoff functions for both of these models are convex. The lines (jh)
and (ig) demonstrate the optimal lines for these models. Similarly, to calculate the
payoff at time 1, the 2-period model T2(0, 0) needs to be used and the line (fd)
shows the optimal line for this model. Finally, we have the super-replication price
p¯i(ϕ) = max {V1(S0, S1 = S0d),V1(S0, S1 = S0u)}.
2.4 Continuous Time Model
In this section, we discuss the asymptotic behavior of the model. We define the
probability spaces (Ωn,Fn,Qn), n ∈ N such that Ωn = {0, 1}n, and Fn is the Borel
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σ-algebra on Ωn. For every ωn = (ωn1 , . . . , ω
n
n) ∈ Ωn, we define a coordinate map by
Zn` (ω
n) = ωn` for each ` ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Define the filtration {Fn` , ` = 0, . . . , n}, where
Fn` is the σ-field σ(Zn1 , . . . , Zn` ) generated by the first ` variables for ` = 1, . . . , n and
F0 is the trivial σ-field.
Let µ, σ, r ∈ [0,∞), H ∈ N, and T > 0 (fixed time horizon). Then, define the
sequences
µn = µTδ
2
n, σn = σ
√
Tδn, un = exp (µn + σn),
dn = exp (µn − σn), rn = rTδ2n, Hn = HTδ2n. (2.43)
Where the order δn = 1/
√
n, as in Donsker’s theorem.
Remark 11. H characterizes the number of periods we have delayed information,
which is constant in the asymptotic analysis. However, Hn is the amount of time
we have delayed information, which should vanish in the limit. Otherwise, the super-
replication price would explode and converge to the maximum of the contingent claim
payoff function.
2.4.1 Price Process Asymptotic
Define the probability measures Qn, similar to (2.28) and (2.29), such that Zn` , ` =
1, . . . , n with initial position Zn0 is a Markov chain, and for ` = 1, . . . , n −H − 1, it
has transition matrix
Qn =
 qn,d pn,d
qn,u pn,u
 on {0, 1}, (2.44)
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Besides, for m = n−H, . . . , n,
Qn
(
Znn = · · · = Znn−H = 1|Znn−H−1 = 1
)
= pn,u,
Qn
(
Znn = · · · = Znn−H = −1|Znn−H−1 = 1
)
= qn,u,
Qn
(
Znn = · · · = Znn−H = 1|Znn−H−1 = 0
)
= pn,d,
Qn
(
Znn = · · · = Znn−H = −1|Znn−H−1 = 0
)
= qn,d. (2.45)
Where pn,u, qn,u, pn,d and qn,d are defined, similar to (2.19), as
pn,u :=
u
(H)
n ern − d(H+1)n
u
(H+1)
n − d(H+1)n
= 1− qn,u, pn,d := d
(H)
n ern − d(H+1)n
u
(H+1)
n − d(H+1)n
= 1− qn,d, (2.46)
Then, the risky asset price Sn` , similar to (2.1), satisfies
Sn` = S0 exp
[
`µn + σn
∑`
i=1
Xni
]
, ` = 0, . . . , n. (2.47)
Where Xni = 2Z
n
i − 1.
Lemma 3 provides asymptotic for pn,u and pn,d.
Lemma 3. We have
pn,u =
2H + 1
2(H + 1)
−
(
µ− r
2 (H + 1)σ
+
2H + 1
4(H + 1)
σ
)√
Tδn +O
(
δ2n
)
, (2.48)
pn,d =
1
2(H + 1)
−
(
µ− r
2 (H + 1)σ
+
2H + 1
4(H + 1)
σ
)√
Tδn +O
(
δ2n
)
. (2.49)
Proof. The proof simply follows by using Taylor’s expansion on un, dn and rn, and
plugging them in (2.46).
Discretize the time interval by setting tn` := T`/n. By interpolating the risky asset
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price process (Sn` ) on the intervals [t
n
`−1, t
n
` ) constant piecewisely, we get the process
S(n) = (S
(n)
t )0≤t≤T
S
(n)
t := S
n
bntc/T , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.50)
Where b.c is the floor function.
The process S(n) has trajectories which are right continuous with left limits. Note
that in particular
S
(n)
tn`
= Sn` , ` = 0, . . . , n.
Here, S(n) under measure Qn is distributed according to a probability measure ρn on
the Skorokhod space D[0, T ] of right continuous functions with left limits. Theorem
5 provides a weak convergence for the sequence (ρn)n∈N.
Theorem 5. The sequence of processes (S(n))n∈N converges in distribution to the
process (St)0≤t≤T with dynamics
dSt = rStdt+ σ˜dWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T. (2.51)
Where (Wt)0≤t≤T is a Brownian motion, and we have the enlarged volatility
σ˜ =
√
2H + 1σ. (2.52)
Proof. First, note that
Qn
(
Xn` = 1|Xn`−1
)
=
1
2
[
pn,u + pn,d +X
n
`−1 (pn,u − pn,d)
]
, ` = 1, . . . , n−H − 1,
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According to Lemma 3, we conclude that
Qn
(
Xn` = 1|Fn`−1
)
= p`
(
`,Xn`−1
)
, ` = 1, . . . , n−H − 1,
where in the notation of [24]
pn(`, x) =
1
2
[1 + φδn + λnx] +O(δ2n),
φ = −2
[
µ− r
2 (H + 1)σ
+
2H + 1
4 (H + 1)
σ
]√
T ,
λn =
H
H + 1
+O(δ2n).
[24] provides a functional central limit theorem for generalized correlated random
walks. If we define functions an(t, y) := λn and bn(t, y) := φ, theorem 1 and remark
3 in [24] and continuous mapping theorem show that S(n), regardless of the initial
distribution of Xn0 , converges in distribution to (St)0≤t≤T in (2.51). Note that here
λn = pn,u−pn,d corresponds to the gap caused by the delay in the flow of information,
and this is the main source making the price process under the pricing measure more
volatile. A brief summary of the asymptotic results in [24] are provided in (A).
2.4.2 Exaggerated Volatility Smile
In this subsection, we discuss the volatility smile of the model, and how it evolves
with the number of periods (n). Volatility smile is the graph of Black-Scholes implied
volatility with respect to the strike price. Implied volatility is the value of the volatility
in the Black-Scholes pricing model which generates a price equal to that of our model.
Several market features, such as crash phobia, have been attributed as the culprits
of the market smile. The volatility smile has been one of the central topics in option
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pricing literature, and many models have been developed to capture it. We refer to
[19] for more discussion in this regard.
Our model with delayed information shows that delayed information exaggerates
the smile. Figure 2.5 plots the volatility smiles for call and put options in the model
with and without delayed information when n = 100. In the model with delayed
information (Hn =
1
100
year ≈ 2.52 days), we observe volatility smile, on the contrary
with the model without delayed information where we get an almost flat smile, which
is expected according to the Remark 9. Note that in the model with delayed infor-
mation, we have different smiles for call and put option, and that is because there is
not any call-put parity, as discussed in Remark 3.
Figure 2.5 plots the volatility smiles for call and put options when the number
of periods is very big (n = 250, 000) for the model with delayed information (Hn =
1
250,000
year ≈ 30 seconds). We observe almost the same flat volatility smiles for both
call and put options, which can be also calculated by the theoretical results in 2.52.
These volatility smiles in Figures 2.5 and 2.6 confirm the intuition of traders that
delayed information would exaggerate the volatility smile, but it is not its culprit.
This is because in the continuous limit, volatility is constant and there is no smile,
but in the discrete model, we can observe volatility smile. Therefore, it conveys that
the smile observed in the market might have been exaggerated by the way we interact
with delayed information, and the smile might not be caused all by the market itself.
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Figure 2.5: Volatility smile for the Call and Put options in the binomial model
with and without delayed information (Hn =
1
100 year ≈ 2.52 days and 0 day
respectively). The parameters are σ = 0.1, T = 1, r = 0, S0 = 40, and n = 100
Figure 2.6: Volatility smile for the Call and Put options in the binomial model
with delayed information (Hn =
1
250,000 year ≈ 30 seconds). The parameters are
σ = 0.1, T = 1, r = 0, S0 = 40, and n = 250, 000
40
Chapter 3
Systemic Risk and Stochastic
Games with Delay
3.1 Abstract
We propose a model of inter-bank lending and borrowing which takes into account
clearing debt obligations. The evolution of log-monetary reserves of N banks is de-
scribed by coupled diffusions driven by controls with delay in their drifts. Banks are
minimizing their finite-horizon objective functions which take into account a quadratic
cost for lending or borrowing and a linear incentive to borrow if the reserve is low
or lend if the reserve is high relative to the average capitalization of the system. As
such, our problem is an N -player linear-quadratic stochastic differential game with
delay. An open-loop Nash equilibrium is obtained using a system of fully coupled
forward and advanced backward stochastic differential equations. We then describe
how the delay affects liquidity and systemic risk characterized by a large number of
defaults. We also derive a close-loop Nash equilibrium using an HJB approach. This
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chapter is a joint work with Rene´ Carmona, Jean-Pierre Fouque and Li-Hsien Sun.
3.2 Introduction
In [6], we proposed a stochastic game model of inter-bank lending and borrowing
where banks borrow from or lend to a central bank with no obligation to pay back
their loans and no gain from lending. The main finding was that in equilibrium,
the central bank is acting as a clearing house, liquidity is created, thus leading to a
more stable system. Systemic risk was analyzed as in [15] in the case of a linear model
without control. Systemic risk being characterized as the rare event of a large number
of defaults occurring when the average capitalization reaches a prescribed level, the
conclusion was that inter-bank lending and borrowing leads to stability through a
flocking effect. For this type of interaction without control, we also refer to [14, 17]
and [18].
In order to make the toy model of [6] more realistic, we introduce delay in the
controls. This forces banks to take responsibility for past lending and borrowing. In
this paper, the evolution of the log-monetary reserves of N banks is described by a
system of delayed stochastic differential equations, and banks try to minimize their
costs or maximize their profits by controlling the rate of borrowing or lending. They
interact via the average capitalization meaning that banks consider this average as a
critical level to determine borrowing from or lending to the central bank.
We identify open-loop Nash equilibria by solving fully coupled forward and ad-
vanced backward stochastic differential equations (FABSDEs) introduced by [39]. Our
conclusion is that the new effect created by the need to pay back or receive refunds
due to the presence of the delay in the controls, reduces the liquidity observed in the
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case without delay. However, despite these quantitative differences, the central bank
is still acting as a clearing house. A closed-loop Nash equilibrium to this stochas-
tic game with delay is derived from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
approach using the results in [22] and we provide a verification Theorem.
For a general introduction to BSDEs, stochastic control and stochastic differen-
tial games without delay, we refer to the recent monograph [5]. Stochastic control
problems with delay have been studied from various points of view. When the de-
lay only appears in the state variable, solutions to delayed optimal control problems
were derived from variants of the Pontryagin-Bismut-Bensoussan stochastic maximum
principle. See for instance [36] and [37]. Alternatively, in order to use dynamic pro-
gramming, [32] and [33] reduce the system with delay to a finite-dimension problem,
but still the delay does not appear in the control like in the case we want to study.
The general case of stochastic optimal control of stochastic differential equations
with delay both in the state and the control is studied using an infinite-dimensional
HJB equation in [21], and [22]. The case with pointwise delayed control is studied in
[23]. The general stochastic control problem in the case of delayed states and controls
both appearing in the forward equation is studied in [8], [9] and [43] by using the
forward and advanced backward stochastic equations. Linear-Quadratic mean field
Stackelberg games with delay and with a major player and many small players are
studied in [2].
The typical problem studied in this paper can be described as follows. The dy-
namics of the log-monetary reserves of N banks are given by the following coupled
diffusion processes X it , i = 1, · · · , N ,
dX it =
(
αit − αit−τ
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.1)
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where W it , i = 1, · · · , N are independent standard Brownian motions, and the rate
of borrowing or lending αit represents the control exerted by bank i on the system.
In this example, we use the simplest possible form of delay, the delayed control αit−τ
corresponding to repayments after a fixed time τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ T . We shall use
deterministic initial conditions given by
X i0 = ξ
i, and αit = 0, t ∈ [−τ, 0). (3.2)
For simplicity, we assume that the banks have the same volatility σ > 0. In what
follows we use the notations X = (X1, · · · , XN), x = (x1, · · · , xN), α = (α1, · · · , αN),
and x = 1
N
∑N
i=1 x
i.
Before concentrating on the specific case (3.1), we prove a dedicated version of
the sufficient condition of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle for a more
general class of models for which the dynamics of the states are given by stochastic
differential equations of the form:
dX it =
(∫ τ
0
αit−sθ(ds)
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.3)
where θ is a nonnegative measure on [0, τ ]. The special case (3.1) corresponds to
θ = δ0 − δτ .
Bank i chooses its own strategy αi in order to minimize its objective function of
the form:
J i(α) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(XT )
}
. (3.4)
In this paper, we concentrate on the running and terminal cost functions used in [6],
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namely:
fi(x, α
i) =
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x− xi) + 
2
(x− xi)2, q ≥ 0,  > 0, (3.5)
and
gi(x) =
c
2
(
x− xi)2 , c ≥ 0, (3.6)
with q2 <  so that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α). Note that the case τ > T corresponds
to no repayment and therefore no delay in the equations,. The case τ = 0 corresponds
to the case with no control and therefore no lending or borrowing. The term qαi(x−
xi) in the objective function (3.5) is an incentive to lend or borrow from a central
bank which in this model does not make any decision and simply provides liquidity.
However, we know that in the case with no delay ([6]), in equilibrium, the central
bank acts as a clearing house. We will see in Section 3.7 that this is still the case
with delay.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we briefly review the model
without delay presented in [6]. The analysis of the stochastic differential games with
delay is presented in Section 3.4 where we derive an exact open-loop Nash equilibrium
using the FABSDE approach. In the process, we derive the clearing house role of
the central bank in Remark 12. Section 3.5 is devoted to the derivation of a closed-
loop equilibrium using an infinite-dimensional HJB equation approach with pointwise
delayed control presented in [23]. In Section 3.6, we provide a verification Theorem.
The effect of delay in term of financial implication is discussed in Section 3.7 where
the main finding is that the introduction of delay in the model does not change the
fact that in equilibrium, the central bank acts as a clearing house. However, liquidity
is affected by the delay time.
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3.3 Stochatic Games and Systemic Risk
The aim of this section is to briefly review the model of inter-bank lending or
borrowing without delay studied in [6]. It is described by the model presented in the
previous section but with τ > T so that the delay term αit−τ in (3.1) is simply zero.
The setup (3.4,3.5,3.6) of the stochastic game remains the same.
The open-loop problem consists in searching for an equilibrium among strategies
{αit, i = 1, · · · , N} which are adapted processes satisfying some integrability property
such as E
(∫ T
0
|αit|dt
)
<∞. The Hamiltonian for bank i is given by
H i(x, yi, α) =
N∑
k=1
αkyi,k +
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x− xi) + 
2
(x− xi)2, (3.7)
where yi = (yi,1, · · · , yi,N), i = 1, · · · , N are the adjoint variables.
For a given α = (αi)i=1,···,n, the controlled forward dynamics of the states X it are
given by (3.1) without the delay term and with initial conditions X i0 = ξ
i. The adjoint
processes Y it = (Y
i,j
t ; j = 1, · · · , N) and Zit = (Zi,j,kt ; j = 1, · · · , N, k = 1, · · · , N)
for i = 1, · · · , N are defined as the solutions of the backward stochastic differential
equations (BSDEs):
dY i,jt = −∂xjH i(Xt, Y it , αt)dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t (3.8)
with terminal conditions Y i,jT = ∂xjgi(XT ) for i, j = 1, · · · , N where gi is given by
(3.6). For each admissible strategy profile α = (αi)i=1,···,n, standard existence and
uniqueness results for BSDEs apply and the existence of the adjoint processes is
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guaranteed. Note that from (3.7), we have
∂xjH
i = −qαi( 1
N
− δi,j) + (x− xi)( 1
N
− δi,j).
The necessary condition of the Pontryagin stochastic maximum principle suggests
that one minimizes the Hamiltonian H i with respect to αi which gives:
αˆi = −yi,i + q(x− xi). (3.9)
With this choice for the controls αi, the forward equation becomes coupled with the
backward equation (3.8) to form a forward-backward coupled system. In the present
linear-quadratic case, we make the ansatz
Y i,jt = φt(
1
N
− δi,j)(X t −X it), (3.10)
for some deterministic scalar function φt satisfying the terminal condition φT = c.
Using this ansatz, the backward equations (3.8) become
dY i,jt = (
1
N
− δi,j)(X t −X it)
[
q(1− 1
N
)φt − (− q2)
]
dt+
N∑
k=1
Zi,j,kt dW
k
t . (3.11)
Using (3.9) and (3.10), the forward equation becomes
dX it =
[
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
(X t −X it)dt+ σdW it . (3.12)
Differentiating the ansatz (3.10) and identifying with the Ito’s representation (3.11),
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one obtains from the martingale terms the deterministic adjoint variables
Zi,j,kt = φtσ(
1
N
− δi,j)( 1
N
− δi,k) for k = 1, · · · , N,
and from the drift terms that the function φt must satisfy the scalar Riccati equation
φ˙t = 2q(1− 1
2N
)φt + (1− 1
N
)φ2t − (− q2), (3.13)
with the terminal condition φT = c. The explicit solution is given in [6]. Note that
the form (3.9) of the control αit, and the ansatz (3.10) combine to give:
αit =
[
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
(X t −X it), (3.14)
so that, in this equilibrium, the forward equations become
dX it =
(
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
)
(X t −X it)dt+ σdW it . (3.15)
Rewriting (X t − X it) as 1N
∑N
j=1(X
j
t − X it), we see that the central bank is simply
acting as a clearing house. From the form (3.15), we observe that the X i’s are mean-
reverting to the average capitalization given by
dX t =
σ
N
N∑
j=1
dW jt , X0 =
1
N
N∑
j=1
ξj.
In [15], we identified the systemic event as
{
min
0≤t≤T
(X t −X0) ≤ D
}
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and we computed its probability
P
(
min
0≤t≤T
(X t −X0) ≤ D
)
= 2Φ
(
D
√
N
σ
√
T
)
, (3.16)
where Φ is the N (0, 1)-cdf. This systemic risk probability is exponentially small of
order exp(−D2N/(2σ2T )) as in the large deviation estimate.
3.4 Stochastic Games with Delay
Most often, a tailor made version of the stochastic maximum principle is used as
a workhorse to construct open loop Nash equilibria for stochastic differential games.
Here, we provide such a tool in a more general set up than used in the paper because
we believe that this result is of independent interest on its own. We then specialize
it to the model considered for systemic risk in Section 3.4.3.
3.4.1 The Model
We work with a finite horizon T > 0. Recall that we denote by τ > 0 the delay
length. As explained in the introduction, the delay is implemented with a (signed)
measure θ on [0, τ ], and in the case of interest, we shall use the particular case
θ = δ0 − δτ . All the stochastic processes are defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P)
equipped with a right continuous filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T . The state and control
processes are denoted by X = (Xt)0≤t≤T and ff = (αt)0≤t≤T . They are progressively
measurable processes with values in (Rd)N and a closed convex subset A of (Rd)N
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respectively. They are linked by the dynamical equation:
dXt =< α[t], θ > dt+ σdWt (3.17)
where W = (Wt)0≤t≤T is a (d × N)-dimensional F-Brownian motion, σ is a positive
constant or a matrix. We use the notation α[t] = α[t−τ,t] for the restriction of the path
of α to the interval [t−τ, t]. By convention, and unless specified otherwise, we extend
functions defined on the interval [0, T ] to functions on [−τ, T + τ ] by setting them
equal to 0 outside the interval [0, T ]. Also, we use the bracket notation < f, θ > to
denote the integral
∫ τ
0
f(s)θ(ds).
We assume that the dynamics of the state Xt of the system are given by a stochas-
tic differential equation (3.17) which we can rewrite in coordinate form if we denote
by X it the N components of Xt, in which case we can interpret X
i
t as the private state
of player i:
dX it =
(∫ τ
0
αit−sθ(ds)
)
dt+ σdW it , 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.18)
where the components W it , i = 1, · · · , N of Wt are independent standard Wiener
processes, and the component processes (αit)t≥0 can be interpreted as the strategies
used by the individual players. As explained in the introduction, θ is a nonnegative
measure on [0, τ ] implementing the impact of the delay on the dynamics. Recall
that the special case of interest corresponds to θ = δ0 − δτ . We assume the initial
conditions:
X i0 = ξ
i, and αit = 0, t ∈ [−τ, 0). (3.19)
The assumptions that the various states have the same volatility σ > 0 and the
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delay measure θ is the same for all the players are only made for convenience. These
symmetry properties are important to derive mean field limits, but they are not really
needed when we deal with finitely many players. The objective function of player i
is given by (3.4) which we repeat here:
J i(α) = E
{∫ T
0
fi(Xt, α
i
t)dt+ gi(XT )
}
.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the cost fi to player i depends only upon
the control αit of player i, and not on the controls α
j
t for j 6= i of the other players. In
the case of games with mean field interactions, the cost functions are often of the form
fi(x, α) = f(x
i, x, α) and gi(x) = g(x
i, x), as in the particular case of the systemic
risk model studied in this paper where:
fi(x, α
i) = f(xi, x, αi) =
(αi)2
2
− qαi(x− xi) + 
2
(x− xi)2,
for q ≥ 0 and  > 0 as in (3.5), and:
gi(x) = g(x
i, x) =
c
2
(
x− xi)2 , c ≥ 0,
as in (3.6) and with q2 <  to make sure that fi(x, α) is convex in (x, α). Next, we
introduce the system of adjoint equations.
3.4.2 The Adjoint Equations
For each player i and each given admissible control αi = (αit)0≤t≤T for player i,
we define the adjoint equation for player i as the Backward Stochastic Differential
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Equation (BSDE):
dY it = −∂xfi(Xt, αit)dt+ ZitdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.20)
with terminal condition Y iT = ∂xgi(XT ), and we call the processes Y
i = (Y it )0≤t≤T and
Zi = (Zit)0≤t≤T the adjoint processes corresponding to the strategy α
i = (αit)0≤t≤T
of player i. Notice that each Yi has the same dimension as X, namely N × d if
d is the dimension of each individual player private state X it , while each Z
i has
dimension N2 × d. Accordingly, we shall use the notation Y it = (Y i,jt )j=1,···,N where
each Y i,jt has the same dimension d as each of the private states X
j
t , and similarly,
Zit = (Z
i,j,k
t )j,k=1,···,N . In the application of interest to us in this paper we have d = 1.
As before, the following notation will turn out to be helpful. If Y = (Yt)0≤t≤T
is a progressively measurable process (scalar or multivariate) with continuous sample
paths, we denote by Y˜ = (Y˜t)0≤t≤T the process defined by:
Y˜t = E
[ ∫ τ
0
Yt+sθ(ds) |Ft
]
=
∫ τ
0
E[Yt+s|Ft] θ(ds), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Moreover, for each t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ (Rd)N and y ∈ Rd, we denote by αˆi(x, y) any α ∈ Rd
satisfying:
∂αfi(x, α) = −y. (3.21)
Under specific assumptions the implicit function theorem will provide existence of αˆi,
and regularity properties of this function with respect to the variables x and y.
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3.4.3 Sufficient Condition for Optimality
Theorem 6. Let us assume that the cost functions fi are continuously differentiable
in (x, α) ∈ (Rd)N × Rd, and gi are continuously differentiable on (Rd)N with partial
derivatives of (at most) linear growth, and that:
(i) the functions gi are convex;
(ii) the functions (x, α) 7→ fi(x, α) are convex.
If α = (α1t , · · · , αNt )0≤t≤T is an admissible adapted (open loop) strategy profile, and
(X,Y,Z) = ((X1t , · · · , XNt ), (Y 1t , · · · , Y Nt ), (Z1t , · · · , ZNt )) are adapted process such
that the dynamical equation (3.17) and the adjoint equations (3.20) are satisfied for
the controls αit = αˆ
i(Xt, Y˜
i,i
t ), then the strategy profile α = (α
1
t , · · · , αNt )0≤t≤T is an
open loop Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We follow the proof given in [5] in the case without delay. We fix i ∈
{1, · · · , N}, a generic admissible control strategy (βt)0≤t≤T for player i, and for the
sake of simplicity, we denote by X ′ the state X(αˆ
−i,β)
t controlled by the strategies
(αˆ−i, β). The function gi being convex, almost surely, we have:
gi(XT )− gi(X ′T )
≤ (XT −X ′T ) · ∂xgi(XT )
= (XT −X ′T ) · Y iT
=
∫ T
0
(Xt −X ′t) dY it +
∫ T
0
Y it d(Xt −X ′t)
= −
∫ T
0
(Xt −X ′t) · ∂xfi(Xt, αit) dt+
∫ T
0
Y it · < α[t] − (αˆ−i, β)[t], θ > dt + martingale
= −
∫ T
0
(Xt −X ′t) · ∂xfi(Xt, αit) dt+
∫ T
0
Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt + martingale.
Notice that we can use the classical form of integration by parts is due to the fact
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that the volatilities of all the states are the same constant σ. Taking expectations of
both sides and plugging the result into
J i(α)− J i((α−i,β)) = E
{∫ T
0
[fi(Xt, α
i
t)− fi(X ′t, βt)]dt
}
+ E{gi(XT )− gi(X ′T )},
we get:
J i(α)− J i((α−i,β))
≤ E
{∫ T
0
[fi(Xt, α
i
t)− fi(X ′t, βt)]dt−
∫ T
0
(Xt −X ′t) · ∂xfi(Xt, αit) dt
}
+ E
{∫ T
0
Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt
}
≤ E
{∫ T
0
[αit − βt]∂αfi(Xt, αit) + Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt
}
. (3.22)
Notice that:
E
[ ∫ T
0
Y i,it · < αi[t] − β[t], θ > dt
]
= E
[ ∫ τ
0
(∫ T−s
−s
Y i,it+s[α
i
t − αit]dt
)
θ(ds)
]
=
∫ τ
0
∫ T
0
E[Y i,it+s[αit − βt]dt θ(ds)]
=
∫ τ
0
∫ T
0
E[E[Y i,it+s|Ft][αit − βt]dt θ(ds)]
= E
[ ∫ τ
0
∫ T
0
(∫ τ
0
E[Y i,it+s|Ft]θ(ds)
)
[αit − βt]dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
Y˜ i,it · [αit − βt]dt
]
.
Consequently:
J i(α)− J i((α−i,β)) ≤ E
{∫ T
0
(
[αit − βt]∂αfi(Xt, αit) + Y˜ i,it · [αit − βt]
)
dt
}
= 0
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by definition (3.21) of αˆ(t, Xˆt, Y˜
i,i
t ).
Example
We shall use the above result when d = 1, θ = δ0 − δ−τ so that < α[t], θ >=∫ δ
0
αt−τ θ(dτ) = αt−αt−δ, and the cost functions are given by (3.5) and (3.6), namely:
fi(x, α) =
1
2
α2 − qα(x− xi) + 
2
(x− xi)2
for some positive constants q and  satisfying q < 2 which guarantees that the
functions fi are convex. Notice that relation (3.21) gives αˆ
i(x, y) = −y − q(xi − x).
To derive the adjoint equations we compute:
∂xifi(x, α) = (1− 1
N
)[qα+ (xi − x)], and ∂xjfi(x, α) = − 1
N
[qα+ (xi − x)],
for j 6= i. Accordingly, the system of forward and advanced backward equations
identified in the above theorem reads:
dXit = − < Y˜ i,i[t] + q(Xi[t] −X [t]), θ > dt+ σdW it , i = 1, · · · , N
dY i,jt = (δi,j − 1N )[qY˜ i,jt + (q2 − )(Xit −Xt)]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t i, j = 1, · · · , N
(3.23)
where we used the Kronecker symbol δi,j which is equal to 1 if i = j and 0 if i 6= j.
If we specialize this system to the case θ = δ0 − δτ , we have Y˜ i,jt = Y i,jt − E[Y i,jt+τ |Ft],
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so that the forward advanced-backward system reads:

dXit = (−Y i,it + Y i,it−τ + E[Y i,it+τ |Ft]− E[Y i,it |Ft−τ ]
−q[Xit −Xit−τ −Xt +Xt−τ ])dt+ σdW it , i = 1, · · · , N
dY i,jt = (δi,j − 1N )[qY i,jt − qE[Y i,jt+τ |Ft] + (q2 − )(Xjt −Xt)]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,j,k
t dW
k
t
i, j = 1, · · · , N.
(3.24)
The version of the stochastic maximum principle proved in Theorem 6 reduces the
problem of the existence of Nash equilibria for the system, to the solution of forward
anticipated-backward stochastic differential equation. The following result can be
used to resolve the existence issue but first we make the following remark which is
key in term of financial interpretation.
Remark 12 (Clearing House Property). In the present situation, in contrast
with the case without delay presented in Section 3.3, we will not be able to derive
explicit formulas for the equilibrium optimal strategies such as (3.14). However, it is
remarkable to see that the clearing house property
∑
αi = 0 still holds. Indeed, setting
i = j in (3.23) and summing over N to derive an equation for Y t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Y
i,i
t and
Z
k
t =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Z
i,i,k
t , we find:
dY t = −
(
1
N
− 1
)
qY˜ tdt+
N∑
k=1
Z
k
t dW
k
t , t ∈ [0, T ],
with terminal condition Y t = 0 for t ∈ [T, T + τ ]. This equation admits the unique
solution:
Y t = 0, t ∈ [0, T + τ ], and Zkt = 0, k = 1, · · · , N, t ∈ [0, T ].
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and as a result,
αˆt = −Y˜ t = 0. (3.25)
In what follows, on the top of q2 < , we further assume that
q2(1− 1
2N
)2 ≤ (1− 1
N
), (3.26)
which is satisfied for N large enough, or q small enough.
Theorem 7. The FABSDE (3.24) has a unique solution.
Proof. Assuming that (Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,···,N) is given as an input, we solve the system
(3.37) for λ = λ0 and the processes φt, ψ
k
t , rt and the random variable ζ replaced
according to the prescriptions:
φt ← φt + κ[Yˇt− < ˜ˇY [t] + qXˇ[t], θ >]
ψkt ← ψkt + κ[Zˇkt + σ(
1
N
− δi,k)], k = 1, · · · , N
rt ← rt + κ[Xˇt + (1− 1
N
)[q ˜ˇY t + (q2 − ) Xˇt]]
ζ ← ζ + κ[−XˇT + c(1− 1
N
)XˇT ],
and denote the solution by (X, Y, (Zk)k=1,···,N). In this way, we defined a mapping
Φ : (Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,···,N)→ Φ(Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,···,N) = (X, Y, (Zk)k=1,···,N),
and the proof consists in proving that the latter is a contraction for small enough
κ > 0.
Consider (X̂, Ŷ , (Ẑk)k=1,···,N) = (X −X ′, Y − Y ′, (Zk − Zk′)k=1,···,N) where
(X, Y, (Zk)k=1,···,N) and (X ′, Y ′, (Zk
′
)k=1,···,N) are the corresponding image using in-
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puts (Xˇ, Yˇ , (Zˇk)k=1,···,N) and (Xˇ ′, Yˇ ′, (Zˇk′)k=1,···,N). We obtain
dX̂t = [−(1− λ0)Ŷt − λ0 < ˜̂Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > +κ[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]]dt
+
N∑
k=1
[−(1− λ0)Ẑkt + κ ̂ˇZkt ]dW kt
dŶt = [−(1− λ0)X̂t + λ0(1− 1
N
)[q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − )X̂t]
+κ[ ̂ˇX t + (1− 1
N
)[q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ) ̂ˇX t]]]dt+ N∑
k=1
Ẑkt dW
k
t , (3.27)
with initial condition X̂0 = 0 and terminal conditions ŶT = (1−λ0)X̂T +λ0c(1− 1N )X̂T
− κ ̂ˇXT + κc(1− 1N ) ̂ˇXT and Ŷt = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c > 0, and ŶT = 0
and Ŷt = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c = 0. As we stated in the text, we only
give the proof in the case c = 0 to simplify the notation. The proof of the case c > 0
is a easy modification. Using the form of the terminal condition and Itoˆ’s formula,
we get
0 = E[ŶT X̂T ]
= E
∫ T
0
{
Ŷt
[
− (1− λ0)Ŷt − λ0 < ˜̂Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > +κ[ ̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]]
+X̂t
[
− (1− λ0)X̂t + λ0(1− 1
N
)[q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − )X̂t]
+κ[ ̂ˇX t + (1− 1
N
)[q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ) ̂ˇX t]]]− (1− λ0) N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2+κ
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt}dt
(3.28)
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= −(1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt− λ0E
∫ T
0
Ŷt <
˜̂
Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > dt
+κE
∫ T
0
Ŷt[
̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]dt− (1− λ0)E∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt
+λ0(1− 1
N
)E
∫ T
0
X̂t[q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − )X̂t]dt
+κE
∫ T
0
X̂t[
̂ˇX t + (1− 1
N
)[q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ) ̂ˇX t]]dt
−(1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt+ κ
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt dt (3.29)
and rearranging the terms we find:
(1− λ0)[E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2 dt]
= κE
∫ T
0
X̂t
̂ˇX tdt− λ0E∫ T
0
Ŷt <
˜̂
Y [t] + qX̂[t], θ > dt
+κE
∫ T
0
Ŷt[
̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]dt
+λ0(1− 1
N
)E
∫ T
0
X̂t[q
˜̂
Y t + (q
2 − )X̂t]dt
+κ(1− 1
N
)E
∫ T
0
X̂t[q
˜ˇ̂
Y t + (q
2 − ) ̂ˇX t]]dt+ κE∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt dt (3.30)
Letting µ = (1− 1
N
)− q2(1− 1
2N
)2 > 0, we obtain:
(1− λ0 + λ0µ)E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κE
∫ T
0
Ŷt[
̂ˇYt− < ˜ˇ̂Y [t] + q ̂ˇX [t], θ >]dt
+κ(1− 1
N
)E
∫ T
0
((
q2 − ) ̂ˇX t + q ˜ˇ̂Y t)X̂tdt+ κE∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
Ẑkt
̂ˇZkt dt,
and a straightforward computation using repeatedly Cauchy–Schwarz and Jensen’s
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inequalities leads to the existence of a positive constant K1 such that
(1− λ0 + λ0µ)E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ (1− λ0)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κK1
{
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
+E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt}.
Referring to [3], applying Itoˆ’s formula to |X̂t|2 and |Ŷt|2, Gronwall’s inequality, and
again Cauchy-Schwarz and Jensen’s inequalities, owing to 0 ≤ λ0 ≤ 1, we obtain a
constant K2 > 0 independent of λ0 so that
sup
0≤t≤T
E|X̂t|2≤ κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2+| ̂ˇY t|2+ N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
+K2
{
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2+
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
}
,
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt ≤ κK2T
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2+| ̂ˇY t|2+ N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
+K2T
{
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2+
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
}
,
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2+
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt ≤ κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2+| ̂ˇY t|2+ N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
+K2E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt. (3.31)
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By using (3.31), there exists 0 < µ′ < µ/K2 such that
λ0µ
′K2E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt
≥ λ0µ′
(
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2+
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
)
−λ0µ′κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2+| ̂ˇY t|2+ N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
≥ λ0µ′
(
E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2+
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
)
−µ′κK2
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2+| ̂ˇY t|2+ N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
(3.32)
Therefore, we have
(
1− λ0 + λ0(µ−K2µ′)
)
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt
+(1− λ0 + λ0µ′)E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ (1− λ0 + λ0µ′)E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κK1
{
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
+E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2}
+κK2µ
′
{
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
}
. (3.33)
Note that since µ−K2µ′ and µ′ stay in positive, we have (1−λ0 +λ0(µ−K2µ′)) ≥ µ′′
and (1 − λ0 + λ0µ′) ≥ µ′′ where for some µ′′ > 0. Combining the inequalities (3.31-
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3.33), we obtain
E
∫ T
0
|X̂t|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
|Ŷt|2dt+ E
∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
|Ẑkt |2dt
≤ κK
(
E
∫ T
0
| ̂ˇX t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
| ̂ˇY t|2dt+ E∫ T
0
N∑
k=1
| ̂ˇZkt |2dt
)
, (3.34)
where the constant K depends upon µ′, µ′′, K1, K2, and T . Hence, Φ is a strict
contraction for sufficiently small κ.
Remark 13. While this theorem gives existence of open loop Nash equilibria for
the model, it is unlikely that uniqueness holds. However, the cost functions fi and
gi depending only upon x
i and x, one could consider the mean field game problem
corresponding to the limit N → ∞, and in this limiting regime, it is likely that the
strict convexity of the cost functions could be used to prove some form of uniqueness
of the solution of the equilibrium problem.
Proof. We first solve the system considering only the case j = i. Once this is done, we
should be able to inject the process Xt = (X
1
t , · · · , XNt ) so obtained into the equation
for dY i,jt for j 6= i, and solve this advanced equation with random coefficients.
Summing over i = 1, · · · , N the equations for X i in (3.23), using the clearing
house property of Remark 12, and denoting ξ = 1
N
∑N
i=1 ξ
i give
X t = ξ +
σ
N
N∑
i=1
W it , t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.35)
Therefore, without loss of generality, we can work with the “centered” variables X i,ct =
X it −X t, Y i,i,ct = Y i,it −Y t = Y i,it , and Zi,i,k,ct = Zi,i,kt −Zkt = Zi,i,kt which must satisfy
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the system:

dX i,ct = − < Y˜ i,i[t] + qX i,c[t] , θ > dt+ σ
∑N
k=1(δi,k − 1N )dW kt ,
dY i,it = (1− 1N )[qY˜ i,it + (q2 − )X i,ct ]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
i,i,k
t dW
k
t
(3.36)
with X i,c0 = ξ
i,c := ξi − ξ, Y i,iT = −c
(
1
N
− 1)X i,cT , and Y i,it = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] for
i = 1, · · · , N . We solve this system by extending the continuation method (see for
example [38] and [39]) to the case of stochastic games. We consider a system which
is written as a perturbation of the previous one without delay. Since we now work
with i ∈ {1, · · · , N} fixed, we drop the exponent i from the notation for the sake of
readability of the formulas.

dXλt = [−(1− λ)Y λt − λ < Y˜ λ[t] + qXλ[t], θ > +φt]dt
+
∑N
k=1[−(1− λ)Zk,λt + λσ(δi,k − 1N ) + ψkt ]dW kt ,
dY λt = [−(1− λ)Xλt + λ(1− 1N )[qY˜ λt + (q2 − )Xλt ] + rt]dt+
∑N
k=1 Z
k,λ
t dW
k
t
(3.37)
with initial conditionXλ0 = ξ
i,c and terminal condition Y λT = (1−λ)XλT−λc
(
1
N
− 1)XλT+
ζ i,i and Y λt = 0 for t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c > 0, and Y λT = ζ i,i and Y λt = 0 for
t ∈ (T, T + τ ] in the case of c = 0.
Here (recall that i is now fixed), φt, ψ
k
t , rt are for k = 1, · · · , N , square integrable
processes which will be chosen at each single step of the induction procedure. Also
ζ is a L2(Ω,FT ) random variable. Observe that if λ = 0, the system (3.37) is a
particular case of the system in Lemma 2.5 in [38] for which existence and uniqueness
is established, and it becomes the system (3.36) when setting λ = 1, ζ i,i = 0, φit = 0,
ψi,i,kt = 0, r
i,i
t = 0, i = 1, · · · , N and k = 1, · · · , N , for 0 ≤ t ≤ T . We only give the
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proof of existence and uniqueness for the solution of the system (3.36) in the case of
c = 0. The same arguments can be used to treat the case c > 0.
The proof relies on the following technical result which we prove in the appendix.
Lemma 4. If there exists λ0 ∈ [0, 1) such that for any ζ and φt, rt, ψkt , k = 1, · · · , N
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T the system (3.37) admits a unique solution for λ = λ0, then there
exists κ0 > 0, such that for all κ ∈ [0, κ0), (3.37) admits a unique solution for any
λ ∈ [λ0, λ0 + κ).
Taking for granted the result of this lemma, we can prove existence and uniqueness
for (3.37). Indeed, for λ = 0, the result is known. Using Lemma 4, there exists κ0 > 0
such that (3.37) admits a unique solution for λ = 0 + κ where κ ∈ [0, κ0). Repeating
the inductive argument n times for 1 ≤ nκ0 < 1 + κ0 gives the result for λ = 1
and, therefore, the existence of the unique solution for (3.36). Since X i,ct = X
i
t −X t,
Y i,i,ct = Y
i,i
t and Z
i,i,k,c
t = Z
i,i,k
t , and X t is given by (3.35), we obtain a unique solution
(X it , Y
i,i
t , Z
i,i,k
t ) to the system (3.23).
3.5 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) Approach
In this section, we return to the particular case θ = δ0−δτ of the drift given by the
delayed control αt − αt−τ . The HJB approach for delayed systems has been applied
by [42] to a deterministic linear quadratic control problem. Later, [20] followed a
similar approach for stochastic control problems. Here, we generalize the approach
[20] based on an infinite dimensional representation and functional derivatives. We
extend this approach to our stochastic game model with delay in order to identify a
closed-loop Nash equilibrium.
Note that two specific features of our discussion require additional work for our
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argument to be fully rigorous at the mathematical level. First, the delayed control in
the state equation appears as a mass at time t− τ and a smoothing argument as in
[23] is needed. Second, we are using functional derivatives and proper function spaces
should be introduced for our computations to be fully justified. However, since most
of the functions we manipulate are linear or quadratic, we refrain from giving the
details. In that sense, and for these two reasons, what follows is merely heuristic. A
rigorous proof of the fact that the equilibrium identified in this section is actually a
Nash equilibrium will be given in Section 3.6.
3.5.1 Infinite Dimensional Representation
Let HN be the Hilbert space defined by
HN = RN × L2([−τ, 0];RN),
with the inner product
〈z, z˜〉 = z0z˜0 +
∫ 0
−τ
z1(ξ)z˜1(ξ) dξ,
where z, z˜ ∈ HN , and z0 and z1(.) correspond respectively to the RN -valued and
L2([−τ, 0];RN)-valued components.
By reformulating the system of coupled diffusions (3.1) in the Hilbert space HN ,
the system of coupled Abstract Stochastic Differential Equations (ASDE) for Z =
(Z1, · · · , ZN) ∈ HN appears as
dZt = (AZt +Bαt) dt+GdWt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (3.38)
Z0 = (ξ, 0) ∈ HN .
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where Wt = (W
1
t , · · · ,WNt ) is a standard N -dimensional Brownian motion and ξ =
(ξ1, · · · , ξN).
Here Zt = (Z0,t, Z1,t,r), r ∈ [−τ, 0] corresponds to (Xt, αt−τ−r) in the system of
diffusions (3.1). In other words, for each time t, in order to find the dynamics of
the states Xt, it is necessary to have Xt itself, and the past of the control αt−τ−r,
r ∈ [−τ, 0].
The operator A : D(A) ⊂ HN → HN is defined as
A : (z0, z1(r))→ (z1(0),−dz1(r)
dr
) a.e., r ∈ [−τ, 0],
and its domain is
D(A) = {(z0 , z1 (.)) ∈ HN : z1 (.) ∈W 1 ,2 ([−ø , 0 ];RN ), z1 (−ø) = 0}.
The adjoint operator of A is A∗ : D(A∗) ⊂ HN → HN and is defined by
A∗ : (z0, z1(r))→ (0, dz1(r)
dr
) a.e., r ∈ [−τ, 0],
with domain
D(A∗) = {(w0 ,w1 (.)) ∈ HN : w1 (.) ∈W 1 ,2 ([−ø , 0 ]);RN ),w0 = w1 (0 )}.
The operator B : RN → HN is defined by
B : u→ (u,−δ−τ (r)u), r ∈ [−τ, 0],
where δ−τ (.) is the Dirac measure at −τ .
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Remark 14. Note that in [20], the case of pointwise delay is not considered as the
above operator B becomes unbounded because of the dirac measure. Here, we still use
the unbounded operator B (in a heuristic sense!) and for a rigorous treatment, we
refer to [23] where they use partial smoothing to accommodate the case of pointwise
delay.
Finally, the operator G : RN → HN is defined by
G : z0 → (σz0, 0).
Remark 15. Let Zt be a weak solution of the system of coupled ASDEs (3.38) and
Xt be a continuous solution of the system of diffusions (3.1), then, with a similar line
of reasoning as in Proposition 2 in [20], it can be proved that Xt = Z0,t, a.s. for all
t ∈ [0, T ].
3.5.2 System of Coupled HJB Equations
In order to use the dynamic programming principle for stochastic games (we refer
to [5]) in search of closed-loop Nash equilibrium, the initial time is varied. At time
t ∈ [0, T ], given initial state Zt = z (whose second component is the past of the
control), bank i chooses the control αi to minimize its objective function J i(t, z, α).
J i(t, z, α) = E
{∫ T
t
fi(Z0,s, α
i
s)dt+ gi(Z0,T ) | Zt = z
}
, (3.39)
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In equilibrium, that is all other banks j 6= i have optimized their objective function,
bank i’s value function V i(t, z) is
V i(t, z) = inf
αi
J i(t, z, α). (3.40)
The set of value functions V i(t, z), i = 1, · · · , N is a solution (in a suitable sense) of
the following system of coupled HJB equations:
∂tV
i +
1
2
Tr(Q∂zzV
i) + 〈Az, ∂zV i〉+H i0(∂zV i) = 0, (3.41)
V i(T ) = gi,
where Q = G ∗G, and the Hamiltonian function H i0(pi) : HN → R is defined by
H i0(p
i) = inf
αi
[〈Bα, pi〉+ fi(z0, αi)]. (3.42)
Here, pi ∈ HN and can be written as pi = (pi,1, · · · , pi,N) where pi,k ∈ H1, k =
1, · · · , N . Given that fi(z0, αi) is convex in (z0, αi),
αˆi = −〈B, pi,i〉 − q(zi0 − z¯0). (3.43)
Therefore,
H i0(p) = 〈Bαˆ, pi〉+ fi(z0, αˆi),
=
N∑
k=1
〈B, pi,k〉 (−〈B, pk,k〉 − q(zk0 − z¯0))
+
1
2
〈B, pi,i〉2 + 1
2
(− q2)(z¯0 − zi0)2. (3.44)
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We then make the ansatz
V i(t, z) = E0(t)(z¯0 − zi0)2 − 2(z¯0 − zi0)
0∫
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
+
0∫
−τ
0∫
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(z¯1,s − zi1,s)(z¯1,r − zi1,r)dsdr + E3(t),
(3.45)
where E0(t), E1(t, s), E2(t, s, r) and E3(t) are some deterministic functions to be
determined. It is assumed that E2(t, s, r) = E2(t, r, s).
Remark 16. Note that the ansatz (3.45) depends on z ∈ HN whose second component
is the past of all banks’ controls α. In other words, the value function V i(t, z) is an
explicit function of the past of all banks’ controls αt−τ−r, r ∈ [−τ, 0].
The derivatives of the ansatz (3.45) are as follows
∂tV
i =
dE0(t)
dt
(z¯0 − zi0)2 − 2(z¯0 − zi0)
0∫
−τ
∂E1(t,−τ − s)
∂t
(z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
+
0∫
−τ
0∫
−τ
∂E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
∂t
(z¯1,s − zi1,s)(z¯1,r − zi1,r)dsdr +
dE3(t)
dt
,
(3.46)
∂zjV
i =

2E0(t)(z¯0 − zi0)− 2
0∫
−τ
E1(t,−τ − s)(z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
−2(z¯0 − zi0)E1(t, s) + 2
0∫
−τ
E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)(z¯1,r − zi1,r)dr

(
1
N
− δi,j
)
,
(3.47)
∂zjzkV
i =
 2E0(t) −2E1(t,−τ − s)
−2E1(t,−τ − s) 2E2(t,−τ − s,−τ − r)
( 1
N
− δi,j
)(
1
N
− δi,k
)
. (3.48)
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By plugging the ansatz (3.45) into the HJB equation (3.41), and collecting all the
corresponding terms, the following set of equations are derived for t ∈ [0, T ] and
s, r ∈ [−τ, 0].
The equation corresponding to the constant terms is
dE3(t)
dt
+ (1− 1
N
)σ2E0(t) = 0, (3.49)
The equation corresponding to the (z¯0 − zi0)2 terms is
dE0(t)
dt
+ 
2
= 2(1− 1
N2
)(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2 + 2q(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) +
q2
2
. (3.50)
The equation corresponding to the (z¯0 − zi0)(z¯1 − zi1) terms is
∂E1(t,s)
∂t
− ∂E1(t,s)
∂s
= 2(1− 1
N2
)
(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2(1− 1
N2
)
)
(E2(t, s, 0) + E1(t, s)) .
(3.51)
The equation corresponding to the (z¯1 − zi1)(z¯1 − zi1) terms is
∂E2(t,s,r)
∂t
− ∂E2(t,s,r)
∂s
− ∂E2(t,s,r)
∂r
=
2(1− 1
N2
) (E2(t, s, 0) + E1(t, s)) (E2(t, r, 0) + E1(t, r)) . (3.52)
70
Systemic Risk and Stochastic Games with Delay Chapter 3
The boundary conditions are
E0(T ) =
c
2
,
E1(T, s) = 0,
E2(T, s, r) = 0,
E2(t, s, r) = E2(t, r, s), (3.53)
E1(t,−τ) = −E0(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ),
E2(t, s,−τ) = −E1(t, s), ∀t ∈ [0, T ),
E3(T ) = 0.
Note that with these boundary conditions (at t = T ), we have V i(T, z) = gi(z0) =
c
2
(z¯0 − zi0)2, as desired.
Remark 17. The set of equations (3.49–3.52) on the domain t ∈ [0, T ], s, r ∈ [−τ, 0],
and with boundary conditions (3.53) admits a unique solution. This can be shown by
following the steps of the proof of Theorem 6 in [1] and using a fixed point argument
(see also [8]).
If all the other banks choose their optimal controls, then the bank i’s optimal
strategy αˆi, i = 1, · · · , N follows
αˆit = −〈B, ∂ziV i〉 − q(zi0 − z¯0),
= 2
(
1− 1
N
)[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
(
1− 1
N
)) (z¯0 − zi0)
−
∫ 0
−τ
(E2(t,−τ − s, 0) + E1(t,−τ − s)) (z¯1,s − zi1,s)ds
]
. (3.54)
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In terms of the original system of coupled diffusions (3.1), the closed-loop Nash equi-
librium corresponds to
αˆit = 2
(
1− 1
N
)[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
(
1− 1
N
)) (X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
]
, i = 1, · · · , N.
(3.55)
Remark 18. As pointed out in Remark 12 of Section 3.4, in the present situation we
still have
∑N
i=1 αˆ
i
t = 0 and therefore, in this equilibrium, the central bank serves as a
clearing house (see also the discussion of Section 3.7).
3.6 A Verification Theorem
In this section, we provide a verification theorem establishing that the strategies
given by (3.55) correspond to a Nash equilibrium. Our solution is only almost explicit
because the equilibrium strategies are given by the solution of a system of integral
equations. This approach has been used by [1] to find the optimal control in a
deterministic delayed linear quadratic control problem. Recently, [8] and [25] have
applied this approach to delayed linear quadratic stochastic control problems. In
this section, we generalize it to delayed linear -quadratic stochastic games differential
games.
We recall that at time t ∈ [0, T ], given x = (x1, · · · , xN), which should be viewed
as the state of the N banks at time t, and an A-valued function α on [0, τ), which
should be viewed as their collective controls over the time interval [t − τ, t), bank i
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chooses the strategy αi to minimize its objective function
J i(t, x, α, αt) = E
{∫ T
t
fi(Xs, α
i
s)ds+ gi(XT ) | Xt = x, α[t) = α
}
. (3.56)
Here α[t) is defined as the restriction of the path s 7→ αs to the interval [t− τ, t) and
αt is an admissible control strategy for the N banks over the time interval [t, T ]. We
denote by At this set of admissible strategies.
In the search for Nash equilibria, for each bank i, we assume that the banks
j 6= i chose their strategies α−i,t for the future [t, T ], in which case, bank i’s should
choose a strategy αi,t ∈ Ai,t in order to try to minimize its objective function
J i(t, x, α, (αi,t, α−i,t)). As a result we define the value function V i(t, x, α, α−i,t) of
bank i by:
V i(t, x, α, α−i,t) = inf
αi,t∈Ai,t
J i(t, x, α, (αi,t, α−i,t)). (3.57)
Because of the linear nature of the dynamics of the states, together with the quadratic
nature of the costs, we expect that in equilibrium, the functions J i and V i to be
quadratic functions of the state x and the past α of the control. This is consistent
with the choices we made in the previous section. Accordingly, we write the functions
V i as
V i(t, x, α) = E0(t)(x¯− xi)2 + 2(x¯− xi)
t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
+
t∫
t−τ
t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t, r − t)(α¯s − αis)(α¯r − αir)dsdr + E3(t), (3.58)
where the deterministic functions Ei (i = 0, · · · , 3), are the solutions of the system
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(3.49–3.52) with the boundary conditions (3.53). We dropped the dependence of V i
upon its fourth parameter α−i,t because the right hand side of (3.58) does not depend
upon α−i,t.
The main result of this section is Proposition 2 below which says that any solution
of the system (3.55) of integral equations provides a Nash equilibrium. For that
reason, we first prove existence and uniqueness of solutions of these integral equations
when they are recast as a fixed point problem in classical spaces of adapted processes.
This is done in Lemma 5 below. We simplify the notation and we rewrite equation
(3.55) for the purpose of the proof of the lemma. We set:
ϕ(t) = 2
(
1− 1
N
)(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2
(
1− 1
N
))
and
ψ¯(t, s) = [E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)]1[t−τ,t](s)
so that equation (3.55) can be rewritten as:
αˆit = ϕ(t)(X¯t −X it) +
∫ t
0
ψ¯(t, s)( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
= ϕ(t)
(
(ξ¯ − ξi)−
∫ t
0
[( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)− ( ¯ˆαs−τ − αˆis−τ )]ds+ σ[W¯t −W it ]
)
+
∫ t
0
ψ¯(t, s)( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds. (3.59)
Summing these equations for i = 1, · · · , N , we see that any solution should necessarily
satisfy
∑
1≤i≤N αˆ
i = 0, so that if we look for a solution of the system (3.55), we might
as well restrict our search to processes satisfying ¯ˆαt = 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
So we denote by RN0 the set of elements x = (x1, · · · , xN) of RN satisfying
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∑
1≤i≤N x
i = 0, and by H2,N0 the space of RN0 -valued adapted processes a = (at)0≤t≤T
satisfying
‖a‖20:= E
[ ∫ T
0
|at|2dt
]
<∞.
Clearly, H2,N0 is a real separable Hilbert space for the scalar product derived from the
norm ‖ · ‖0 by polarization. For a ∈ H2,N0 we define the RN0 -valued process Ψ(a) by:
Ψ(a)it = ϕ(t)(ξ¯− ξi) + σϕ(t)[W¯t−W it ] +
∫ t
0
ψ(t, s)aisds, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, · · · , N.
(3.60)
where the function ψ is defined by ψ(t, s) = 1− 1[0,0∨(t−τ)](s)− ψ¯(t, s). We shall use
the fact that the functions ϕ and ψ are bounded.
Given the above set-up, existence and uniqueness of a solution to (3.55) is given
by the following lemma whose proof mimics the standard proofs of existence and
uniqueness of solutions of stochastic differential equations.
Lemma 5. The map Ψ defined by (3.60) has a unique fixed point in H2,N0 .
We now prove existence of Nash equilibria for the system.
Proposition 1. The strategies (αˆit)0≤t≤T, i=1,···,N given by the solution of the system
of integral equations (3.55) form a Nash equilibrium, and the corresponding value
functions are given by (3.58).
In other words, we prove that
V i(0, ξi, α[0)) ≤ J i(0, ξi, α[0), (αi, αˆ−i)),
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for any αi, and choosing αi = αˆi gives:
V i(0, ξi, α[0)) = J
i(0, ξi, α[0), (αˆ
i, αˆ−i)).
Notice that the equilibrium strategies which we identified are in feedback form in the
sense that each αˆit is a deterministic function of the trajectory X[0,t] of the past of
the state. Notice also that there is absolutely nothing special with the time t = 0
and the initial condition X0 = ξ, α[0) = 0. Indeed for any t ∈ [0, T ] and RN -valued
square integrable random variable ζ, the same proof can be used to construct a Nash
equilibrium for the game over the interval [t, T ] and any initial condition (Xt = ζ, α[t)).
Proof. We fix an arbitrary i ∈ {1, · · · , N}, an admissible control αi ∈ A−i for player
i, and we assume that the state process (Xt)0≤t≤T for the N banks is controlled by
(αit, αˆ
i
t)0≤t≤T where (αˆ
k
t )0≤t≤T, k=1,···,N solves the system of integral equations (3.55).
Next, we apply Itoˆ’s formula to V i(t,Xt, α[t)) where the function V
i is defined by
(3.58). We obtain
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dV i(t,Xt, α[t)) ={
dE0(t)
dt
(X¯t −X it)2 + 2E0(t)(X¯t −X it)
(
α¯t − αit − (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
)
+
N∑
j=1
σ2E0(t)(
1
N
− δi,j)2 + 2
(
α¯t − αit − (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
) t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)
t∫
t−τ
[
∂E1(t, s− t)
∂t
− ∂E1(t, s− t)
∂s
]
(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)E1(t, 0)(α¯t − αit)− 2(X¯t −X it)E1(t,−τ)(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
+
t∫
t−τ
t∫
t−τ
[
∂E2(t, s− t, r − t)
∂t
− ∂E2(t, s− t, r − t)
∂s
−∂E2(t, s− t, r − t)
∂r
]
(α¯s − αis)(α¯r − αir)dsdr
+(α¯t − αit)
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t, 0)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t, 0, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

−(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t,−τ)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t,−τ, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

+
dE3(t)
dt
}
dt
+
N∑
j=1
{
+ 2E0(t)(X¯t −X it)(
1
N
− δi,j)
+2(
1
N
− δi,j)
t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
}
σdW jt . (3.61)
Then, integrating between 0 and T , using V i(T,XT ) = gi(XT ) (ensured by the bound-
ary conditions at t = T for Ek, k = 0, 1, 2, 3), taking expectation, using the differential
equations (3.49-3.52), using the short notation A1 = 1− 1N , A2 = 1− 1N2 , and adding
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E
T∫
0
fi(Xs, α
i
s)dt on both sides, one obtains:
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + E(gi(XT )) + E
T∫
0
fi(Xs, α
i
s)dt = −V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), α)
= E
T∫
0
{[
− 
2
+ 2A2(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2 + 2q(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) +
q2
2
]
(X¯t −X it)2
+2E0(t)(X¯t −X it)
(
(α¯t − αit)− (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
)
+ σ2E0(t)
N∑
j=1
(
1
N
− δi,j)2
+2
(
α¯t − αit − (α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
) t∫
t−τ
E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)
t∫
t−τ
[
2A2
(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A2
)(
E2(t, s− t, 0)
+E1(t, s− t)
)]
(α¯s − αis)ds
+2(X¯t −X it)E1(t, 0)(α¯t − αit)− 2(X¯t −X it)E1(t,−τ)(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
+
t∫
t−τ
t∫
t−τ
[
2A2 (E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t))
(
E2(t, r − t, 0)
+E1(t, r − t)
)]
(α¯s − αis)(α¯r − αir)dsdr
+(α¯t − αit)
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t, 0)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t, 0, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

−(α¯t−τ − αit−τ )
 t∫
t−τ
E2(t, s− t,−τ)(α¯s − αis)ds+
t∫
t−τ
E2(t,−τ, r − t)(α¯r − αir)dr

−A1σ2E0(t) + 1
2
(αit)
2 − qαit(X¯t −X it) +

2
(X¯t −X it)2
}
dt. (3.62)
Observe that the terms in  cancel, the terms in σ2 cancel, and the terms involving
delayed controls cancel using symmetries and boundary conditions (3.53) for the
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functions Ek’s.
Next, motivated by (3.55), we rearrange the terms left in (3.62) so that the square
of
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it) +
∫ t
t−τ
[
E2(t, s− t, 0)
+E1(t, s− t)
]
( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
]
appears first. We obtain
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), α) =
E
T∫
0
{
1
2
(
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
])2
+(X¯t −X it)2
[
− 2[A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t) + q
2
]2 + 2A2(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2
+2q(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)) +
q2
2
]
+(X¯t −X it)
[
2αit[A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t)] + 2(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))(α¯t − αit)
]
+(X¯t −X it)
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
− 4A1
(
A1(E1(t, 0)
+E0(t) +
q
2
)
+ 4A2
(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A2
)]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
2A1α
i
t + 2(α¯t − αit)
]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)2 [−2A21 + 2A2]
}
dt. (3.63)
Using A2 = A
2
1 +
2
N
A1 and the relation α¯t − αit = 1N
∑
j 6=i
αjt −A1αit, we simplify (3.63)
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to obtain:
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), α) =
E
T∫
0
{
1
2
(
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
])2
+(X¯t −X it)2
[
4
N
A1(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
2 +
2q
N
(E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
]
+(X¯t −X it)
[
2
N
∑
j 6=i
αjt (E1(t, 0) + E0(t))
]
+(X¯t −X it)
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
8
N
A1(E1(t, 0)
+E0(t)) +
2q
N
]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)[
2
N
∑
j 6=i
αjt
]
+
(∫ t
t−τ
(E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)(α¯s − αis)ds
)2 [
4
N
A1
]}
dt. (3.64)
Now, assuming that the players j 6= i are using the strategies αˆjt given by (3.55), the
quantity
∑
j 6=i
αjt becomes
∑
j 6=i
αˆjt = −2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
]
.
Plugging this last expression in (3.64), one sees that the terms after the square cancel
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and we get
−V i(0, ξi, α[0)) + J i(0, ξi, α[0), (αi, αˆ−i)) =
E
T∫
0
{
1
2
(
αit − 2A1
[(
E1(t, 0) + E0(t) +
q
2A1
)
(X¯t −X it)
+
∫ t
t−τ
[E2(t, s− t, 0) + E1(t, s− t)] ( ¯ˆαs − αˆis)ds
])2}
dt.
(3.65)
Consequently V i(0, ξi, α[0)) ≤ J i(0, ξi, α[0), (αi, αˆ−i)), and choosing αi = αˆi leads to
V i(0, ξi, α[0)) = J
i(0, ξi, α[0), (αˆ
i, αˆ−i)).
3.7 Financial Implications and Numerical Illustra-
tion
The main finding is that taking into account repayment with delay does not change
the fact that the central bank providing liquidity is acting as a clearing house in all
the Nash equilibria we identified (open-loop in Section 3.4 or closed-loop in Sections
3.5 and 3.6).
The delay time, that is the single repayment maturity τ that we considered in this
paper, controls the liquidity provided by borrowing and lending. The two extreme
case are:
1. No borrowing/lending: τ = 0:
In that case, no liquidity is provided and the log-reserves X it follow independent
Brownian motions.
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2. No repayment: τ ≥ T :
This is the case studied previously in [6] and summarized in Section 3.3. The
rate of liquidity (the speed at which money is flowing through the system) is
given by
[
q + (1− 1
N
)φt
]
as shown in equation (3.12).
3. Intermediate regime 0 < τ < T :
We conjecture that the rate of liquidity is monotone in τ . For instance, in the
case of the close-loop equilibrium obtained in Section 3.6 given by (3.55), the
rate of liquidity is [2E1(t, 0) + 2E0(t) + q] where the function E1 and E0 are
solutions to the system (3.49–3.51). These solutions are not given by closed
form formulas. We computed them numerically. We show in Figure 3.1 that as
expected, liquidity increases as τ increases. This is clear for values of τ which
are small relative to the time horizon T . For values of τ which are large and
comparable with T , the boundary effect becomes more important as oscillations
propagate backward.
82
Systemic Risk and Stochastic Games with Delay Chapter 3
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
1.4
1.45
Time(t)
Li
qu
id
ity
 ra
te
 (2
E 1
(t,0
)+2
E 0
(t)
+q
)
 
 
τ=0.1
τ=1
τ=2
τ=5
τ=20
Figure 3.1: Liquidity as a function of the delay time τ . The parameters are T = 20,
q = 1, ε = 2, and c = 0.
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Appendix A
Generalized Correlated Random
Walks Diffusion Limit
This section provides a diffusion limit for generalized correlated random walks. It is
a brief version of [24], up until some notational changes.
Consider probability spaces (Ωn,Fn,Pn), n ∈ N where we define binary random
variables Xnk taking −1 and 1. Then define Y n by
Y nk = Y
n
0 +
k∑
j=1
(
µn + σnX
n
j
)
, k = 0, . . . , n
Where µn and σn are defined as in A.1.
Define tnk := Tk/n, and then by the constant interpolation on the intervals
[tnk−1, t
n
k), we get the Right Continuous with Left Limits (RCLL) process Y
(n) by
Y
(n)
t := Y
n
bntc/T , 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
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Let F(n) =
(
F (n)t
)
0≤t≤T
. Therefore
F (n)t = σ
(
Y n0 , . . . , Y
n
k−1
)
:= Fnk−1, t ∈ [tnk−1, tnk), k = 1, . . . , n.
Here, Y (n) under measure Pn is distributed according to a probability measure ρn
on the Skorokhod space D[0, T ] of RCLL functions. The goal is to provide a weak
convergence result for (ρn), n ∈ N under some regularity conditions.
We impose three conditions:
• There exists constants µ ∈ R, σ > 0 and β ∈ (0, 1) such that
µn = µδ
2
n +O
(
δ1+βn
)
,
σn = σδn +O
(
δ2+βn
)
. (A.1)
• We have
Pn
(
Xnk = 1|Fnk−1
)
= pn
(
k, Y nk−1, X
n
k−1
)
, k = 1, . . . , n.
Where
pn (k, y, x) =
1
2
(1 + xa (tnk , y) + δnb (t
n
k , y)) +O
(
δ1+βn
)
.
k = 1, . . . , n, y ∈ R, x = −1, 1
• Functions a(., .) and b(., .) are regular enough such that we can define the op-
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erator L on C2 functions f(y) via
(Lf) (t, y) :=
1
2
σ2
1 + a(t, y)
1− a(t, y)f
′′(y) +
(
µ+
σb(t, y)
1− a(t, y) +
σ2a′(t, y)
(1− a(t, y))2
)
f ′(y).
Theorem 8. If (Y n0 ) converges in distribution to Y0, and the martingale problem for
L is well-posed on C[0, T ], then
(
Y (n)
)
converges in distribution to Y with dynamics
dYt =
(
µ+
σb(t, Yt)
1− a(t, Yt) +
σ2a′(t, Yt)
(1− a(t, Yt))2
)
dt+ σ
√
1 + a(t, Yt)
1− a(t, Yt)dWt (A.2)
and initial value Y0.
The starting point for the proof is the following proposition (2) from [13].
Proposition 2. Define the operator G on C∞ functions f with compact support by
Gf := 1
2
cf ′′ + γf ′ where c : R → [0,∞) and γ : R → R are continuous functions.
Assume that the martingale problem for G is well-posed on C[0, T ]. Consider Γ(n) and
C(n) as F(n)-adapted processes such that N (n) := Y (n)− Y (n)0 − Γn and
(
N (n)
)2−C(n)
are (F(n),Pn) local martingales for all n, and C(n) is increasing. Define the stopping
time
τ rn := inf
{
t ≥ 0
∣∣∣|Y (n)t |≥ r or |Y (n)t− |≥ r} ∧ 1.
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Also, assume that
lim
n→∞
En
[
sup
0≤t≤τrn
|Y (n)t − Y (n)t− |2
]
= 0,
lim
n→∞
En
[
sup
0≤t≤τrn
|Γ(n)t − Γ(n)t− |2
]
= 0,
lim
n→∞
En
[
sup
0≤t≤τrn
|C(n)t − C(n)t− |
]
= 0,
sup
0≤t≤τrn
∣∣∣∣∣∣Γ(n)t −
t∫
0
γ(Y (n)s )ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣→ 0, in probability
sup
0≤t≤τrn
∣∣∣∣∣∣C(n)t −
t∫
0
c(Y (n)s )ds
∣∣∣∣∣∣→ 0, in probability
Then (Y (n)) converges in distribution to the solution for the martingale problem (G, ν),
where ν is the probability measure to which Y
(n)
0 under Pn converge weakly.
From now onwards, we drop all subscripts and superscripts n, except for µn and
σn where it might cause confusion.
We first use Doob decomposition and write Y = Y0 +M + A. Then we get
∆Ak := E (∆Yk|Fk−1) = µn + σnE (Xk|Fk−1) = µn + σn (2p(Yk−1, Xk−1)− 1) .
By using our first two conditions,
∆Ak = µδ
2 + σb(Yk−1)δ2 + σnXk−1a(Yk−1) +O(δ2+β).
We use Taylor expansion on a(Yk−1)/1−a(Yk−1) to get
a(Yk−1)
1− a(Yk−1) =
a(Yk−2)
1− a(Yk−2) +
a′(Yk−2)
(1− a(Yk−2))2
∆Yk−1 +O(δ1+β).
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Multiplying both sides by σnXk−1 = ∆Yk−1 − µn, we obtain
σnXk−1
a(Yk−1)
1− a(Yk−1) =
a(Yk−2)
1− a(Yk−2)
(
∆Yk−1 − µδ2
)
+
a′(Yk−2)
(1− a(Yk−2))2
σ2δ2 +O(δ2+β).
Using the identity a/1−a = 1/1−a− 1 and ∆Y = ∆M + ∆A, we derive
∆Yk
1− a(Yk−1) =
∆Mk
1− a(Yk−1) +
1
1− a(Yk−2)∆Yk−1 −∆Yk−1 +
µ+ σb(Yk−1)
1− a(Yk−1) δ
2
+µδ2
(
1− 1
1− a(Yk−2)
)
+
a′(Yk−2)
(1− a(Yk−2))2
σ2δ2 +O(δ2+β).
We now provide three lemmas. For their proofs, we refer to [24].
Lemma 6. Let N be a martingale defined as
Nm :=
m∑
k=1
∆Mk
1− a(Yk−1) , m = 0, . . . , n
Then, define Γ := Y − Y0 −N . We get
Γm =
m∑
k=1
(
µ+
σb(Yk−1)
1− a(Yk−1) +
σ2a′(Yk−1)
(1− a(Yk−1))2
)
δ2 +O(δβ), m = 0, . . . n.
Lemma 7. Define the process C by
Cm :=
m∑
k=1
V ar [∆Mk|Fk−1]
(1− a(Yk−1))2
, m = 0, . . . n.
Then,
Cm =
m∑
k=1
σ2
1 + a(Yk−1)
1− a(Yk−1)δ
2 +O(δβ), m = 0, . . . , n,
and N2 − C is a martingale.
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We now show that the processes N , Γ and C satisfy the assumptions of our
proposition. Define functions
γ(x) := µ+
σb(x)
1− a(x) +
σ2a′(x)
(1− a(x))2 , c(x) := σ
2 1 + a(x)
1− a(x) .
Using our first condition, we get
sup
0≤t≤T
|Y (n)t − Y (n)t− |= max
k=1,...,n
|∆Y nk |= O(δn).
Since Y (n) is the piecewise constant interpolation of Y n, we obtain
sup
0≤t≤T
|Γ(n)t − Γ(n)t− |+ sup
0≤t≤T
|C(n)t − C(n)t− |= O(δβn).
Lemma 8. For our γ, c, Γ(n) and C(n), the last two conditions regarding convergence
in probability in (2) hold.
The above three lemmas show that all the assumptions of Proposition (2) are
satisfied. So, Y (n) converges in distribution to the solution of the martingale problem
(G, ν), which is the same as Y in Theorem (8). This completes the proof.
If we allow functions a and b to depend on either t or n, similar arguments still
go through with some modifications. For more details in this regard, we again refer
to [24].
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